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The purpose of this study is to analyse the development of South Africa’s liquid fuels industry 
from 1930s to the present and the various ways in which the state has extended subsidies and other 
measures of support to liquid fuels producers. The nature and extent of government support to the 
South African liquid fuels industry has remained hidden for many years, due to the veil of secrecy 
surrounding the industry prior to the country’s transition to democracy. The study expands past 
analyses to identify and estimate the magnitude of subsidies to liquid fuels production in South 
Africa in the present. Using the historical institutional approach, the study then places these 
measures of support in the South African political economy environment so as to understand the 
institutional barriers to their reform. In doing so, the study sheds light on the drivers informing the 
endurance of the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry following 
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The nature and extent of government support to the South African liquid fuels industry has 
remained hidden for many years, due to the veil of secrecy surrounding the industry prior to the 
country’s transition to democracy. State support to the liquid fuels industry began as a matter of 
necessity, and was amplified following the United Nation’s oil embargo against South Africa. 
However, the reasons for the endurance of the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the 
liquid fuels industry following the transition to democracy are not as easily determined.  
This study provides an exposition of the subsidies to liquid fuels production and other favourable 
benefits to the liquid fuels producers, both past and present. The importance of such a task cannot 
be overstated in light of the Group of Twenty’s pledge to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies1 
(G20, 2009: 3). However, subsidies to fossil fuel producers can be conferred in a variety of ways. 
That this is the case complicates any attempts to identify and reform these financial support 
measures as some measures are more implicit or hidden than others. Therefore, adopting a clear 
definition of what constitutes a subsidy is an important first step in identifying and reforming these 
subsidies.  
 Additionally, it is necessary to delve deep into the history of the industry to understand why these 
producers continue to receive various measures of support from the South African state. Such an 
investigation will highlight the institutional, political, and economic factors impacting on the 
creation and maintenance of these institutions, thereby highlighting important barriers to subsidy 
reform. 
As the South African state continues to make important decisions regarding South Africa’s energy 
future, it is important to understand the ways in which the liquid fuels industry has historically 
benefited from significant state assistance. Such an investigation will highlight the reasons for the 
maintenance of the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry, despite 
the major political change represented by the end of apartheid and subsequent transition to 
democracy. 
                                                 
1 South Africa is a G20 member. Interestingly, South Africa is one among a number of countries in the G20 to have 
claimed that the country does not have any fossil fuel subsidies (van Asselt & Skovgaard, 2016: 279). 
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1.1. Research Problem 
The research problem addressed by this study concerns the presence of favourable regulations and 
subsidies to liquid fuel production in South Africa.  This project also addresses the ways in which 
these financial and other benefits exist as a result of the structure of relationships between the 
South African state and liquid fuels industry. Indeed, it is a contention of this study that deliberate 
investigation into this issue is necessary as the liquid fuel production subsidies presently in place 
are not once-off occurrences, but are part of a longer history of state support to the liquid fuels 
industry. This support has continued despite major political change in the country.  
Where the state has made a concerted effort to expand renewable energy generation, exploring the 
extent of subsidies and other support measures to the liquid fuels industry is useful as it sheds light 
on the formal and informal institutions, which undermine those efforts. Indeed, production 
subsidies encourage the extraction and production of liquid fuels to be used in other processes, 
such as in electricity generation2. In the case of electricity production, diesel consumed at two of 
Eskom’s diesel power stations, Ankerlig and Gourikwa, benefits from further subsidies (Burton, 
Lott and Rennkamp, in press). The implication of this fact is that these subsidies may distort cost 
comparisons between electricity generated from diesel versus electricity generated from renewable 
energy resources. Furthermore, the South African government has pledged to reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions according to a peak-plateau-decline scenario. This scenario has been 
established in South Africa’s National Climate Change Response White Paper, which outlines a 
strategy to respond to climate change and transition to a low carbon economy (Department of 
Environmental Affairs, 2010). Therefore, it is necessary to shed light on the political economy 
environment that undermines these efforts by supporting high-carbon development 
1.2. Research Questions 
This study’s research question investigates why the liquid fuels subsidies regime and state support 
to the liquid fuels industry have not changed despite South Africa’s transition to democracy. Key 
to this aim is understanding how the core institutions structuring the relationships between the state 
and liquid fuels industry were developed – often to the benefit of liquid fuel producers – and how 
these institutions have been sustained. As evidence of the maintenance of these institutions, the 
                                                 
2 Eskom receives a full fuel levy rebate on diesel consumed to generate electricity at plants that have an installed 
capacity of 200 MW or more (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2015: 128). 
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final part of the analysis explores the magnitude of subsidies and other support measures extended 
to liquid fuel production in South Africa. In doing so, the present study draws on insights from 
historical institutionalism and political economy so as to understand the ways in which the present 
state of the South African liquid fuels industry is informed by the origins and development of its 
institutions.  
1.3. Literature Context: Historical Institutionalism 
The research study uses the historical institutional theoretical approach in order to analyse the 
policy and regulatory developments in South Africa’s liquid fuels industry. Historical 
institutionalism is a theoretical approach used to understand and explain institutional inertia and 
change. The approach has primarily been used to explain institutional inertia and change in 
developed countries in the global north (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Additionally, historical 
institutionalism has often been used to understand the historically grown relationships between 
industries and government (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). Key concepts in historical institutionalism 
include institutional lock in, path dependency, sunk costs, institutional conversion and critical 
junctures and are instrumental in accounting for institutional endurance and change. These 
concepts will be further addressed in the literature review in Chapter Two. 
1.4. Definitions 
1.4.1. Defining Liquid Fuel Production 
Liquid fuel production refers to production occurring in the liquid fuels sector. Included in this 
definition is access, exploration and appraisal, development, extraction, preparation and transport 
of liquid fuel resources, plant construction and operation, distribution and decommissioning (Bast, 
Doukas, Pickard, van der Burg & Whitley, 2015: 9).  
1.4.2. Defining Subsidies 
The study used the World Trade Organisation’s definition of subsidy, as described in the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, as a starting point for defining subsidies. 
According to the Agreement, subsidisation confers a benefit to some entity and involves ‘a 
financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member…or 
price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994’ (World Trade Organisation, 1994: 229). 
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The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s ‘market price transfer’ is also 
included in this definition. In South Africa, these are transfers from consumers to producers of 
liquid fuels resulting from the regulated price of petroleum (OECD Secretariat, 2010: 19). A 
similar approach to defining fossil fuel subsidies has been outlined by the Global Subsidies 
Initiative (GSI, 2010b).  
1.5. Methodology 
The study reviews the development of the fossil fuel industry in South Africa in relation to the 
state so as to understand the way in which these relationships have historically conferred financial 
and other benefits to liquid fuel production. The project is primarily qualitative in nature and 
employs secondary research methods. In doing so, the project synthesises and analyses information 
and data collected from primary and secondary resources. The historical institutional approach is 
used to understand and explain the empirical evidence. The project also entails a quantitative 
component, using the OECD’s method of estimating market price transfers.  
1.6. Chapter Outline 
The project has been laid out in the following way: Chapter Two reviews the literature relevant to 
the research question. Chapter Three details the research methodology used in the study. Chapter 
Four analyses the historical development of the liquid fuels industry, drawing on the historical 
institutional approach and insights from political economy to explain the endurance and change of 
institutions. Using the historical institutionalist approach, Chapter Five investigates the major 
instances of institutional inertia and change in the liquid fuels industry. The final chapter of the 
analysis, Chapter Six, investigates subsidies to the production of liquid fuels in South Africa so as 
to identify the actors benefiting from financial support from the state. Chapter Seven highlights 
the research findings and discusses their significance. Finally, Chapter Eight concludes the 
research project, summarising major findings and suggesting areas for future research.  
II. Literature Review
2.1. Theoretical Literature: Historical Institutionalism 
The research question addressed by this study concerns the reasons for the endurance of state 
support to the liquid fuels industry following South Africa’s transition to democracy. In addressing 
this question, it is necessary to understand the role of institutions. Institutions can be defined in a 
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variety of ways. The narrowest definition of institutions refers to the collection of governmental 
institutions, including the regulatory, administrative and electoral rules that establish the process 
of policy-making in a polity (Ikenberry, 1994: 12). Institutions establish rules and structure 
incentives in human interaction, which create an environment that either constrains or enables 
certain actions (North, 1990; 4; Geels, 2004: 907). These political and social institutions are often 
enduring and commit the future path of policy, and therefore have considerable impact on the 
development of a state. This is particularly so in the case of energy-related institutions due to the 
long lifetimes of energy infrastructure. Similarly, institutions matter for the understanding of the 
ways in which the South African liquid fuels industry has benefited from favourable regulations, 
subsidies and other benefits from the state. The historical institutional approach, which seeks to 
understand institutional inertia and change, is useful in understanding and explaining the 
development of the South African liquid fuels industry and its related policies and regulations. 
This approach is particularly useful given that it has often been used to understand and explain the 
historically developed relationships between the state and industries (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). 
The historical institutional approach sheds light on both the emergence of institutions as well as 
their evolution. The approach is concerned with the way in which institutions are situated in time 
and how these institutions can assist in understanding political outcomes. The concepts of path 
dependency, lock in and sunk costs are mechanism that generate institutional inertia and contribute 
to the ability of the historical institutional approach to account for the way in which institutions 
may remain unchanged. Alternatively, the concepts of institutional conversion and critical 
junctures assist the historical institutional approach in accounting for institutional change. 
Therefore, historical institutionalism is a useful approach for this study, because it helps to explain 
the development of energy policy and regulations in South Africa. 
The historical institutional approach draws on the concept of path dependence in order to explain 
institutional inertia. Margaret Levi (1997: 28) captures this concept when she states, ‘path 
dependence has to mean… that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of 
reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain 
institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice’.  
There are a number of precursors to path dependency, the first of which is that, for institutions 
which entail large start-up costs, the likelihood of reversion is low once that institutional path has 
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been chosen. The second precursor is the learning effect produced as continued use can lead to 
more efficient processes and higher returns. Thirdly, path dependent processes arise as a result of 
coordination effects, referring to the way in which the benefits experienced by individual actors 
are enhanced if they come together with other actors to coordinate activities. The fourth precursor 
is adaptive expectations, referring to the way in which actors adapt their actions based on their 
expectations regarding the actions of other actors (Pierson, 2004: 24-25). 
Additionally, drawing on the broader institutionalist literature, this study also argues that 
institutional path dependence has a discursive aspect, referring to the narratives used to shape, 
explain and justify policy paths (Low, Gleeson and Rush, 2005: 392; Curtis and Low, 2016: 195). 
This distinction is important in analysing the development of South Africa’s liquid fuels industry 
due to the enduring narratives around energy security.  
For the historical institutionalist, path dependence is a key causal mechanism determining 
institutional outcomes (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007:342). Further, rather than correcting failures 
in policy so as to pursue an alternative path, governments frequently exacerbate and reinforce 
them, such as by creating complementary institutional arrangements. That this is the case 
demonstrates that path dependent processes do not only occur at an individual level, but at a macro 
level involving, “configurations of complementary organisations and institutions” (Pierson, 2004: 
27).Furthermore, where complementary institutional arrangements exist, the value of each 
institution is enhanced by the presence of others, a corollary of which is that the removal of one 
complementary institution detracts from the value of others (Pierson, 2004: 286). In the case of 
fossil fuel subsidies, this is often through the provision of additional subsidies and other favourable 
institutional policies in support of pre-existing institutions (Ksomo, 1987). It will be important to 
gauge the extent to which these processes appear in the development of policies and regulations in 
South Africa’s liquid fuels industry. 
Institutional ‘lock in’ is a dominant theme in the historical institutional literature and is used to 
account for institutional stability or resilience which results from  increasing returns and path 
dependent processes of institutions (Garud, Kumaraswamy and Karnoe, 2010: 765; North, 1990: 
7; Ikenberry, 1994). Apart from the way in which path dependent processes contribute to 
institutional lock in, Ikenberry notes that one way in which this may occur is as a result of the way 
in which, ‘institutions tend to establish or codify a particular distribution of power and authority, 
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which tends to reproduce itself’ (1994: 20). Indeed, power relations and interests that develop 
around institutional structures make these difficult to change and can sustain them even after the 
original interests that led to their creation have changed (Moore, 1996; Stinchcombe, 1968: 108-
118). Consequently, a state of institutional inertia and lock in arises when the institutions in place 
serve the interest of key actors.  It will be important to investigate the extent to which this argument 
holds in the case of the South African liquid fuels industry, where the industry’s initial 
development reflected considerable favouritism to the country’s synthetic fuels producers.  
 An alternative explanation for the cause of institutional lock in argues that institutions create ‘sunk 
costs’ which make it difficult to pursue an alternative path (Stinchcombe, 1968: 122-123). This 
view is also reflected in the conference paper by Ikenberry (1994: 20). The implication of this fact 
is that the new institution must be perceived as substantially greater than the old structure in order 
to compensate for the ‘relative weakness of the newer social structure’ (Ikenberry, 1994: 20). 
Stinchcombe refers to this issue as the ‘liability of newness’ (Stinchcombe, 1965: 148). This 
concept appears applicable to the issue of industry regulation, particularly in relation to the 
uncertainties involved in deregulating the liquid fuels industry. 
Alternatively, institutional conversion is presented in the historical institutional literature as an 
important change mechanisms which generates evolution of institutional structures. According to 
this concept, institutional arrangements which are formulated at one historical moment may be 
transformed and redirected to respond to different needs at a later point in time (Thelen, 2002: 
103). Therefore, the importance of this concept is that it highlights the role and importance of 
agency in achieving institutional change. One process through which this can occur is by 
incorporating previously excluded actors who, rather than merely adapting to the prevailing order, 
alter it in some way. These actions then set the institution – the administrative or regulatory rules 
ordering society – on a new trajectory. Interestingly, it seems that this concept also accounts for 
institutional inertia. This is because, while the institution may undergo minor alterations to the way 
in which it operates or to its mandate, the broader institution itself remains. 
In accounting for institutional change, ‘critical junctures’ is an additional mechanism of change 
which derives from the historical institutional literature. Critical junctures are periods of 
institutional flux that arise in the midst of long periods of path-dependent institutional inertia, 
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thereby creating openings for institutional change3. A number of major events may give way to 
critical junctures, including political, financial, or economic crises. During these times, ‘structural 
(i.e. economic, cultural, ideological, organisational) influences on political action are significantly 
relaxed for a relatively short period of time’ (Hogan, 2006: 657). Where an institutional 
arrangement no longer serves actors’ interests following the critical juncture, institutional change 
is likely to be pursued. This also relates to the concept of ‘policy windows,’ which refer to 
‘windows of opportunity’ to achieve changes in policy (Marquard, 2006: 28). Policy windows are 
created when political changes – such as, regime change, elections or budgeting processes – focus 
attention on specific problems and create a favourable environment for policy change.  
In terms of understanding fossil fuel incentives, historical institutionalism offers a number of key 
insights. Fossil fuel subsidies are often ‘rooted in a political logic that is often difficult to alter’ 
(Victor, 2009: 7). The historical institutional approach sheds light on this political logic given its 
attention to the historical development of institutions and the interests that develop around these 
institutions. For this reason, it is also useful for understanding why these institutions are not easily 
altered as it emphasises the factors which cause institutional inertia. 
In the South African liquid fuels industry specifically, historical institutionalism may provide 
insight into the major policies and regulations that have been used to support liquid fuels producers. 
The concepts of institutional lock in, sunk costs and path dependency will be useful for 
understanding and explaining the maintenance of policies and regulations in the liquid fuels 
industry. The ways in which the interests of relevant actors impact on these processes will also be 
considered. In accounting for institutional change, the concept of institutional conversion sheds 
light on the inclusion of Black Economic Empowerment agendas in the regulatory process 
following the transition from apartheid. Black Economic Empowerment first appeared, albeit in a 
limited way, in the African National Congress’s (ANC’s) Mineral and Energy Policy Document. 
This document called for retail regulation encouraging service station ownership by historically 
disadvantaged South Africans (Marquard, 2006: 323) and this goal was later captured as a 
                                                 
3 Capoccia and Kelemen (2007: 350) note that historical institutionalists commonly treat critical junctures as, ‘short 
phases that may actually last for a number of years.’ Therefore, a critical juncture is not necessarily a discrete event 
but rather a collection of related events within a given period.  
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milestone in the 1998 White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa 
(Department of Minerals and Energy, 1998: 81).  
Furthermore, the concept of a critical juncture is important in terms of describing the potential for 
institutional change that was produced by the end of the apartheid regime and subsequent transition 
to democracy. Indeed, the significance of a critical juncture lies in the fact that it may assist in 
discrediting pre-existing institutional arrangements (Cortell & Petersen, 1999; Haggard, 1998). As 
the apartheid state was extensively involved in the liquid fuels industry, it would not be 
unreasonable to expect that the transition to democracy would result in change to the institutions 
structuring the liquid fuels industry.  
While historical institutional concepts have frequently been applied to energy sector development 
in a number of countries (Unruh, 2000; Abdul-Manan, Baharuddin & Chang, 2015), a review of 
the literature revealed only a few studies which used the historical institutional approach to 
understand the impact of fossil fuel subsidies and other incentives. One such example is a study 
into the development of the Iranian energy sector, which found that the policy of subsidising 
petroleum products during the Iran-Iraq war has continued long after the end of the war, leading 
to an increase in electricity and natural gas consumption (Mirsaeedi-Farahani, 2015: 69). The 
present study intends to build on the limited literature which applies the historical institutional 
framework to developing economies, as it has predominantly been used to study developed 
countries in the global north (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). 
However, where historical institutionalism has been applied to understand the endurance of energy 
subsidies and other institutions, the focus has largely been on consumption subsidies rather than 
production subsidies (Mirsaeedi-Farahani, 2015). The contribution of the present study lies in its 
application of historical institutionalism to the endurance of energy subsidies and other institutions 
benefitting fossil fuel producers. Such a focus is necessary in order to shed light on the hidden 
incentive structure offering subsidies and favourable regulations to the production of fossil fuels. 
Identifying these hidden incentives is important as they undermine the government’s stated policy 
objectives in favour of removing certain liquid fuels subsidies and shifting towards renewable 
energy, as stated in the 1998 White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa 
and reiterated in the 2011 White Paper (Department of Environmental Affairs, 2011). These 
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subsidies and favourable regulations have been embedded in the South African economy for 
decades and are resistant to change.  
In investigating why state support to the liquid fuels industry and the liquid fuels subsidy regime 
have continued despite major political change, the historical institutional approach offers valuable 
insight. The strength of the approach in this regard relates to its ability to account for both 
institutional inertia and change. In explaining the ways in which the policies and regulations in the 
liquid fuels industry have become entrenched over time, the concepts of institutional lock in, sunk 
costs and path dependency will be useful. Alternately, in understanding and explaining 
institutional change, the concepts of institutional conversion and critical juncture will shed light 
on the factors which provide the context for change, particularly following the end of the apartheid 
regime. In doing so, this study will contribute to the limited literature that applies historical 
institutionalism to understanding institutions in developing countries, as well as the limited 
literature using this approach to understand and explain the endurance of subsidies and favourable 
regulations to the production of liquid fuels. The following section reviews the literature on fossil 
fuel subsidies and examines challenges in defining subsidies.  
2.2. Theoretical Literature: Subsidies 
It is also important to review the literature related to fossil fuel subsidies so as to determine the 
most appropriate means of defining these subsidies. However, the precise definition of a subsidy 
is difficult to pin down as there is no globally accepted definition of a subsidy (Whitley, 2013: 4; 
van Asselt & Skovgaard, 2016: 270). International organisations adopt different definitions of 
subsidies, which may vary according to their primary targets for support as well as their means of 
transfer. As the measures adopted by states to support fossil fuel production are often a reflection 
of distinct political and economic environments, it is necessary that any definition be sensitive to 
the process of subsidisation in a given context. While there is intellectual contestation over what 
constitutes a subsidy, the most widely accepted definition is the World Trade Organisation’s 
(WTO’s) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) as it has been accepted 
in a multilateral context. It has also been supported following in-depth legal analysis and 
jurisprudence from the Dispute Settlement Body and the Appellate Body (GSI, 2010: 2). The 
present study therefore follows much of the international literature on fossil fuel subsidies and 
adopts the definition of subsidy spelled out in the ASCM. Additionally, the definition of subsidy 
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has been expanded to include what the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
refers to as ‘market price transfers,’ which have been used to estimate both production and 
consumption subsidies (OECD Secretariat, 2012: 19). Taken together, these definitions adequately 
capture the full range of measures used to support fossil fuel production in South Africa. 
Identifying subsidies and other support measures to the fossil fuels industry first requires an 
understanding of the ways in which subsidies are defined. In the ASCM, the WTO establishes the 
most widely accepted definition of a subsidy. According to the Agreement, the first form in which 
subsidies may occur are as direct or potentially direct transfers of funds from governments. These 
include but are not limited to: grants, loan guarantees, provision of loans at below-market rates, 
and equity infusions. The second category of subsidies refers to government revenue foregone, 
such as tax waivers or tax deferrals. Also included are goods and services provided by government, 
apart from infrastructure, at less than market prices. Finally, subsidies may include government 
support of prices and incomes (WTO, 1994: 229).  
This definition aims to identify and stop actions on the part of government that provide unfair 
advantage and impinge on international trade. However, it is important to recognise that while the 
definition has a distinct operational purpose concerned with promoting fair international trade, the 
contents of the Agreement are ‘agreed’ upon by the members of the WTO. Therefore, the political 
reality of having to establish a definition that the member states are willing to accept has an impact 
on the determination of the limits of the definition (Schrank, 2003: 4). As a result, while the 
definition is used for the purpose of ensuring fair international trade, for other purposes each 
individual country has the freedom to determine their own definitions of subsidies. This then lays 
out an important issue for the present study, as it becomes clear that the definition of what exactly 
qualifies as a subsidy is difficult to pin down.  
What is notable about the ASCM definition is that it excludes market price support (MPS), which 
results in transfers between producers and consumers as a result of any government regulations. 
However, the inclusion of this measure is important in the context of South Africa. This is because 
liquid fuels producers have long benefited from supracompetitive prices as a result of regulations 
determining the price of petroleum products. This then highlights the usefulness of the OECD’s 
producer support estimate (PSE) in terms of addressing the present study’s research question. That 
12 
 
is, this indicator captures all forms of subsidisation outlined in the ASCM definition, as well as 
market price support.  
Defining subsidies by combining the ASCM definition with that of the OECD’s measure of 
support is not unfounded. The Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) does this in their report titled, 
‘Defining Fossil Fuel Subsidies for the G-20: Which Approach is Best?’ (GSI, 2010b). The 
subsidies captured in this definition can be found in Table 1 below.  
Table 1: An Illustrative List of Subsidies to South Africa's Liquid Fuels Industry 
Direct transfer or potential direct 
transfer of funds 
Government revenue foregone Income or price support, or relief 
from normal costs or procedures 
Direct payments Tax expenditure: reduced tax rates, 
exemptions, rebates 
Above-market rate prices for producers 
via government regulations or import 
barriers  
Grants Accelerated depreciation allowances Other specific regulations resulting in 
transfers 
Guarantees for loans, security or credit   
Government spending on research and 
development 
  
Loans provided at rates or under 
conditions below those that would 
prevail in a normal market 
  
(Adopted from Global Subsidies Initiative, 2010b: 4-5) 
In terms of answering this study’s research question, this approach to defining subsidies highlights 
the many ways in which liquid fuels production has been subsidised. For instance, it is able to 
capture the direct subsidies to production which are reflected in the Estimates of National 
Expenditure. It is also able to account for the indirect tax subsidies which are not reflected in the 
fiscus but are nevertheless important. Finally, the inclusion of market price support highlights the 
way in which liquid fuels producers have benefited from market price transfers due to the regulated 
price of petroleum. As these different means of supporting liquid fuels have been important 
historically as well as into the present, this definition is therefore sensitive to the development and 
maintenance of the liquid fuels subsidy regime in South Africa. 
In investigating the maintenance of state support to the liquid fuels industry, it is important to 
understand the various measures of financial support extended from the state to liquid fuels 
producers. These measures of financial support refer to subsidies to liquid fuel production and can 
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be defined in a number of ways. The implication of the inability to converge on a definition of 
‘subsidies’ is that it can complicate attempts to identify and measure their value. Accordingly, 
many studies into the issue of fossil fuel production subsidies have adopted the WTO’s definition 
of subsidies as set out in the ASCM due to the fact that it has been agreed upon by the member 
states of the WTO. While the present study will adopt a similar approach, it will also include what 
the OECD calls market price transfers. Such an approach is important as it is able to capture the 
way in which South Africa’s regulated petrol price has conferred subsidies to producers both in 
the present and historically. Therefore, it is suited to understanding the maintenance of the liquid 
fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry following the transition from 
apartheid.  
2.3. Empirical Literature: Studies on Subsidies in South Africa  
As the magnitude of fossil fuel subsidies and other support measures in South Africa is 
underreported and under researched –as will be demonstrated below –research is needed so as to 
gain a thorough understanding of the production subsidies for liquid fuels annually. Thus far, two 
studies have undertaken this challenge. The first study investigated subsidies to fossil fuel 
exploration while the second investigated subsidies to fossil fuel production more broadly. The 
importance of studies such as these relates to the fact that understanding the scale of support 
granted to the fossil fuels industry is an important first step towards phasing out these subsidies. 
The project builds off of these studies into the issue of fossil fuel production subsidies in South 
Africa. However, the present study departs from the previous studies in two key ways. Firstly, the 
present study focuses on subsidies to liquid fuels specifically, whereas previous studies have 
focused on subsidies to fossil fuel production more generally. Secondly, the present study 
emphasises the importance of historically established relationships and the development of 
institutions in sustaining these subsidies to liquid fuels producers. In doing so, it sheds light on the 
factors sustaining the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry 
following the transition to democracy. That is, the study not only quantifies the magnitude of 
subsidies but also attempts to explain their genesis and maintenance, with a view to understanding 
options for reform. 
A review of the literature on liquid fuels production subsidies in South Africa revealed that very 
little research has been done in this area. The two studies undertaken in the context of South Africa 
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were both carried out by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and focused on the fossil fuels 
industry more broadly, as opposed to the liquid fuels industry specifically. While the first study 
focused exclusively on fossil fuel exploration subsidies (Bast, Makhijani, Pickard and Whitley, 
2014), the second study focused on subsidies to the entire fossil fuel production value chain (Bast, 
Doukas, Pickard, van der Burg and Whitley, 2015).  
As previously mentioned, the definition of a ‘subsidy’ adopted by a study has implications for the 
types of subsidies and other support measures captured by that study. The two ODI reports were 
similar in that both studies adopted the ASCM subsidy definition. As a narrower definition of what 
constitutes a subsidy, a major concern in using this definition is that important measures of support 
to the production of fossil fuels were not captured. That is, the studies did not capture the OECD’s 
measure of market price transfers. Therefore, the studies provided a useful starting point in terms 
of understanding the importance of the definition adopted as well as the subsidies that had already 
been captured and reported. However, the reports were limited in their ability to adequately capture 
the full range of subsidies provided to liquid fuel production in the South African context. The 
ODI’s approach in this regard is informed by the fact that narrower definitions are more easily 
agreed upon and the organisation is specifically concerned with promoting subsidies reform in the 
G20 countries.  
Despite the narrower range of subsidies identified by the studies, they make an important 
contribution to the international literature on fossil fuel subsidies. This is because identifying 
subsidies is an important first step in phasing them out. Research has shown that few governments 
are aware of the magnitude of the subsidies they have conferred, often due to the failure to quantify 
each form of support (Whitley, 2013: 7). Additionally, where the data does exist, it is often spread 
across different levels of government and not available to the public. The implication of these 
information gaps is a lack of knowledge about the scale of the problem and the need for reform. 
This is particularly problematic due to the economic and social opportunity costs of these subsidies 
as they may produce a fiscal burden and crowd out spending on development-related programmes 
such as public health or education (Whitley, 2013: 15). 
Finally, as the studies only reported on subsidies within a limited range of years, they also only 
offered a brief glimpse into the issue of fossil fuel production subsidies. Consequently, the studies 
offered limited insight into the political economy in which these subsidies exist or the ways in 
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which some of these subsidies have persisted over time4. That is, unlike the present study, these 
studies do not analyse the interaction of political and economic processes in South African society, 
with a view towards understanding the ways in which the distribution of power and relationships 
between different actors impact on various policy processes and outcomes. Therefore, the 
contribution of the present study is that it identifies a broader range of subsidies to the production 
of liquid fuels in South Africa. Furthermore, it places these subsidies within a historical context 
and their political economy environment so as to identify the institutional barriers to their reform.  
In doing so, the present study is also novel in that it attempts to link the question of historical and 
present support to the South African liquid fuels industry with the broader international debate 
about fossil fuel subsidies. Some measures of support, such as direct transfers, are easily identified 
as subsidies. Alternatively, some measures of support, namely those that arise as a result of 
regulations, are more implicit and not as easily identified as subsidies. In using the OECD’s 
measure of market price support, which is concerned with transfers that occur as a result of policies 
and regulations, the present study highlights the way in which historical and present regulations in 
the industry have resulted in transfers, or subsidies, to liquid fuels producers, although they have 
not often been conceived as such. 
There has been limited research into South Africa’s fossil fuel production subsidies. The two 
studies that have been undertaken, while offering a useful starting point, are limited in the insight 
that they offer to the present study. This is in large part informed by the subsidy definition adopted 
by the studies as the ASCM subsidy definition is incapable of capturing the full range of support 
offered to South Africa’s liquid fuels industry. This then highlights the importance of incorporating 
the OECD’s measure of market price support, as referred to in the previous section of this literature 
review. By focusing on the liquid fuels industry specifically, the present study offers deeper insight 
into South Africa’s liquid fuel production subsidies. The decision to focus on the liquid fuels 
industry specifically was also due to scope constraints, but further work on subsidies to the 
electricity and coal industries can be found in Burton, Lott and Rennkamp (in press). Furthermore, 
the major contribution of the present study is the way in which links support to liquid fuels to the 
broader debate around fossil fuel subsidies and uses a  historical analysis to highlight the reasons 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that this was not the intention of these reports, which were compiled for the G20 countries so as 
to identify fossil fuel subsidies. 
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that support to the industry has endured, thereby shedding light on the institutional barriers to their 
reform. The study therefore accounts for the endurance of the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state 
support to the liquid fuels industry following the transition from apartheid.  
III. Methodology 
The research proceeded in a series of steps. The project identified and collected relevant data and 
information from a variety of sources, while also noting any relevant data constraints. This stage 
relied on secondary research methods. After this step, the available data and information were 
organised in accordance with the determined outline. The data and information were then analysed 
using the historical institutional theoretical approach. During this step, quantitative data in the 
2009-2015 period were also converted into real values so as to allow comparison between years. 
Finally, the estimation of market price transfers were calculated in accordance with the OECD’s 
method of calculation, as outlined below. These project stages were used to shed light on the 
research question concerned with the maintenance of the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state 
support to the liquid fuels industry. 
3.1. The State of the Data: Availability and Constraints 
A major data constraint of this study is that while it seeks to explore the magnitude of support 
extended to liquid fuel production, much of the data on that support is unclear or unreported. 
Unclear and unreported data on fossil fuel subsidies is a common issue and is widely 
acknowledged in the international fossil fuel subsidy literature (Whitley, 2013: 7).  Therefore, 
while data on direct subsidies are available and appear in South Africa’s Estimates of National 
Expenditure, indirect subsidies are seldom clearly reported on. This is particularly the case when 
calculation requires company-specific data from liquid fuels companies. Therefore, where 
necessary data is available, indirect subsidies have been estimated. However, other indirect 
subsidies which are unable to be estimated due to a lack of data have instead been listed. Listing 
these subsidies and support measures is valuable in that they shed light on important areas for 
future research.  
Consequently, it is important to note that the subsidies estimates reported in this study are likely 
to be underestimates. This is both due to lack of detailed reporting and public access to financial 
information as well as making conservative assumptions where calculations are made.  
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3.2. Data Collection 
The project’s primary method of data collection was by use of secondary research methods. That 
is, the project analysed data and information gathered from a wide range of sources. These sources 
include government documents, technical reports, statistical databases, scholarly journals, books, 
company annual reports and news articles.  
A number of scholarly journals and books were used to collect information on the historical 
institutional approach. These resources were collected from the University of Cape Town’s online 
library database. These resources provided theoretical insight into the approach as well as how the 
approach has been applied so as to understand and explain fossil fuel production subsidies.  
In order to analyse the historical development of South Africa’s liquid fuels industry and major 
instances of change and inertia, the project relied on a number of different sources. Technical 
reports were particularly important as a few key reports have previously investigated support to 
the liquid fuels industry and to synthetic fuels producers specifically (Rustomjee, Crompton, 
Maule, Mehlomakulu and Steyn, 2007; Arthur Andersen, 1995; Trollip, 1996). These reports were 
identified through advice from other researchers as well as through reading other reports and 
articles. In most cases, the reports were collected through an online search. Where the reports could 
not be found online, they were collected by contacting the author directly. These reports not only 
provide qualitative insight into the historical development of the industry and relationship between 
actors, but they also provide quantitative insight into instances of support to liquid fuels producers. 
Competition Tribunal documents, including the formal report on the proposed merger of Sasol and 
Engen as well as the transcript hearings, were also used to collect data and information on the 
history of the industry (Competition Tribunal, 2006). The Competition Tribunal report was 
identified from other studies and found online while the hearing transcripts were collected via a 
telephonic request to the Competition Commission. These documents were particularly important 
in understanding Sasol’s role in the industry as well as questions around industry regulation.  
Two dissertations were referenced. The first one was a doctorate dissertation concerned with the 
development of South Africa’s energy policy (Marquard, 2006). Similar to the technical reports, 
this dissertation was used to collect both qualitative and quantitative information on the 
development of the South African liquid fuels industry. This report was also used to gain an 
understanding of South Africa’s political economy during the industry’s early stages. The second 
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dissertation used was a master’s dissertation concerned with the tax regime applicable to the oil 
and gas industry in South Africa (Futter, 2010). This dissertation was used to collect information 
on the previously secretive tax regime applicable to the liquid fuels industry prior to 2007. It was 
also used to understand the ways in which the new tax regime both changed and retained some 
aspects of its predecessor. Both reports were collected through the University of Cape Town’s 
online library database. 
Finally, in order to understand the development of the industry and major instances of change and 
inertia, government documents were used. These included government policies as well as 
statements from various government departments. The government documents were collected 
online through the relevant government departments’ websites.  These documents were used to 
understand the content of policies as well as the government offices’ positions on different issues. 
In some cases, online news articles were used to provide insight into recent developments in the 
liquid fuels industry’s policies and regulations. These articles were identified and collecting using 
relevant keyword searches. These articles were particularly useful as there are few scholarly 
articles or technical reports that have looked at benefits to the liquid fuel producers since 2006. 
Therefore, these articles offered an understanding of more recent developments in the industry. 
A number of resources were collected in order to understand subsidies to the liquid fuels industry 
in the 2009-2015 period. The first two studies were technical reports detailing subsidies to the 
fossil fuels industry in South Africa. These were collected through the University of Cape Town’s 
online library database. The reports were used as a foundation to understand the issue of fossil fuel 
subsidies in South Africa.  
Various government resources were used to collect data on liquid fuels subsidies. South Africa’s 
Estimates of National Expenditure documents were collected online through the National 
Treasury’s budget archives. The departmental reports elaborating on the relevant departments’ 
estimates of expenditure were collected from each departments’ website. These documents were 
used to identify direct transfers to liquid fuels producers in South Africa. A Department of Energy 
presentation was used to identify the average cost, insurance and freight price of petroleum in 
2012. This document was found online. Furthermore, the average annual value of the basic fuel 
price in 20112 was found on the Central Energy Fund’s petrol price archive (Central Energy Fund, 
2012). These sources were used to estimate the value of the market price transfer to Sasol in 2012. 
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Company reports were collected to understand subsidies to the liquid fuels industry in the 2009-
2015 period. The relevant companies’ annual reports were also used to identify the flow of funding 
to the liquid fuels producers. These documents were collected through each companies’ annual 
report online archive. Data on Sasol’s production volumes in 2012 were collected from the 
company’s Analyst Books, which were found on the company’s online handbook archive.  
Finally, inflation data from Business Monitor International was found on the company’s database. 
This inflation data was used to convert the value of subsidies in to real values so as to make them 
comparable across years.  
3.3. Data Analysis 
This research project is largely qualitative in nature. In responding to the research question, 
qualitative data and information on the development of the liquid fuels industry were analysed. 
This entailed a content analysis of written data identified in the various types of sources outlined 
in the previous section. The historical institutional approach was applied to the empirical evidence 
so as to understand and explain the endurance of the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support 
to the liquid fuels industry. Particularly useful in this regard were the concepts of lock in, path 
dependency, perceptions of sunk costs, as well as the effects of vested interests. These historical 
institutional concepts were used to analyse the processes which contributed to institutional inertia 
in the liquid fuels policies and regulations. Conversely, the concepts of institutional conversion 
and critical juncture were applied to understand instances of institutional change by identifying the 
processes through which institutions underwent alterations or were removed. 
The second part of the project is concerned with subsidies to liquid fuels producers in the 2009-
2015 period and employed both qualitative and quantitative methods. Similar to the first part, 
historical institutional concepts were used to shed light on the reasons for which the liquid fuels 
producers continue to benefit from production subsidies. In this regard, the study analysed the way 
in which actors’ vested interests produced institutional inertia, as well as the relationships between 
state and industry actors that sustain the subsidy regime. 
Inflation data in the 2009-2015 period were also used to analyse data in this section. The inflation 
data were used to convert direct subsidies in the 2009-2015 period to real values. This allowed the 
values of the subsidies to be compared across years and allowed these values to be added to find 
the final value of the subsidies. 
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In the quantitative section, the OECD’s method of measuring market price transfers was used. 
Market price transfers are found by multiplying the value of the market price differential, or the 
difference between the domestic and border prices, by the amount of production. This is indicated 
in the formula below.  
Market price transfers = (domestic price – border price) x production volume 
As mentioned in the previous section, the average annual cost, insurance and freight price of 
petroleum was identified in a Department of Energy presentation (Mkhize & Maake, 2012). This 
value was used as the border price, in accordance with the OECD’s guidelines to estimate market 
price transfers for net importers (OECD Secretariat, 2010: 22). The domestic price was found by 
taking the average value of South Africa’s basic fuel price in 2012. Finally, Sasol’s production 
volumes were identified in the company’s 2012 Analyst Book (Sasol, 2012: 52). The data on 
subsidies were used to provide evidence of the continuation of the liquid fuels subsidy regime into 
the present.  
3.4. Conclusion 
The project proceeded in a series of phases so as to respond to the research question. In the first 
phase, secondary research methods were used to identify and collect the relevant data and 
information. This stage also noted the data availability and constraints. The next phase was 
concerned with analysing the data and information. The historical institutional approach was 
applied to the empirical evidence so as to understand the development of the liquid fuels industry 
and major instances of institutional inertia and change. In order to make sense of the quantitative 
data, subsidies in the 2009-2015 period were converted to real values so as to allow comparison 
between years. Finally, the market price transfers were estimated in accordance with the OECD’s 
method of calculating these values. These phases were used to shed light on the maintenance of 
the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry. 
IV. Analysis: Historical Development of the Liquid Fuels Industry 
In order to understand the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry 
in the present, it is important to begin by studying the liquid fuels industry in the past. Such an 
approach provides insight into the institutions that comprise the industry and the ways in these 
institutions which have endured or changed. This approach also explains the causes of these 
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outcomes. Accordingly, the first chapter of the analysis, Chapter Four, begins by outlining the 
important actors and institutions in the liquid fuels industry. The chapter then focuses on the 
industry’s policy and regulatory developments since the 1930s. The historical institutional 
approach is used to explain the drivers of these institutional outcomes. Next, Chapter Five analyses 
major instances of institutional inertia and change following the transition to democracy. Drawing 
on insights from the historical institutional approach, the chapter aims to understand whether these 
institutional changes to the liquid fuels regulatory regime were in fact profound changes or whether 
they were more incremental changes that retained the fundamental aspects of the former 
institutions. The final chapter of the analysis, Chapter Six, delves deeper into South Africa’s liquid 
fuels production subsidies in the present. The chapter aims to understand which actors benefit from 
the liquid fuels subsidy regime as well as how these actors benefit. Ultimately, Chapter Six aims 
to provide evidence of the maintenance of the liquid fuels subsidy regime to the present by 
identifying and measuring the value of these subsidies. These chapters will answer the research 
question by identifying the factors contributing to the endurance of the liquid fuels subsidy regime 
and state support to the liquid fuels industry following South Africa’s transition to democracy. 
4.1. The Liquid Fuels Industry: Key Actors and Institutions 
Researchers and regulatory authorities alike have for many years been concerned with the way in 
which the South African liquid fuels industry developed with significant assistance from the South 
African government (Rustomjee et al, 2007; Competition Tribunal, 2006; Marquard, 2006). These 
efforts have been informed by a number of reasons, such as investigating the competitive 
environment of the industry as well as understanding the policy developments for academic and 
other interests. While the early stages of the industry were dominated by international oil majors, 
the state’s emphasis on local production gave way to the establishment of a local synthetic fuels 
producer, Sasol. To ensure the growth and success of this formerly state-owned producer, as well 
as that of the industry more broadly, the South African government established a number of 
institutions whose aims were to provide direct assistance to the producers. In some cases, these 
institutions were charged with coordinating policy development. The later stages of development 
were defined by an increase in the state’s efforts to promote liquid fuels exploration and 
production. This led to the establishment of the state-owned exploration company and a gas-to-
liquids producer, as well as subsequently consolidating disparate companies into a single coherent 
entity. Using the historical institutional approach to understand and explain the development of 
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the major industry and state actors, this section argues that early developments in the liquid fuels 
industry set the stage for the ongoing liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid 
fuels industry more broadly.  
4.1.1. 1940s to 1970 
In its early stages of development, the South African liquid fuels market was dominated by four 
international oil companies: Caltex, Shell, Mobil and BP (Competition Tribunal, 2006: 18). Prior 
to the commissioning of Mobil’s Genref refinery in 1954, South Africa had only limited refining 
capacity. This refining capacity was through the synthetic fuels refinery produced at the South 
African Torbanite Mining and Refining Company in Boksburg (SATMAR) (Rustomjee et al, 
2006: 57). Government support to the manufacturing of synthetic fuels began around this time, as 
SATMAR enjoyed subsidies in the amount of approximately 20% of the price paid by fuel 
consumers. In addition, the market had to absorb all of SATMAR’s volumes, although these 
volumes were comparatively negligible at the time (Rustomjee at al., 2006: 72; Arthur Andersen, 
1995: 33; Trollip: 1996: 4-27). Rustomjee et al (2006: 72) note that the subsidies provided to 
SATMAR by the South African government established a starting point for future financial support 
to Sasol and Mossgas (now, PetroSA). 
As production volumes from SATMAR were relatively negligible, a majority of demand for liquid 
fuels in South Africa was met by imports. Accordingly, the other oil companies operating in the 
market imported refined product and distributed the product through their respective branded 
retailers. In line with historical institutionalist thinking, ‘this early reliance upon imports set the 
basis for future subsidisation and support for locally refined or manufactured liquids’ (Rustomjee 
et al, 2007: 57). Indeed, the government prioritised the search for crude oil and provided favourable 
fiscal terms in order to encourage the private sector to explore for oil and gas. This claim will be 
investigated further in subsequent sections of the study.  
In 1947, in an attempt to reduce South Africa’s dependence on imported fuels, the South African 
government took the decision to pursue synthetic fuels manufacturing (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 60). 
Legislation was drafted in order to facilitate this goal and, in 1950, the South African Coal, Oil 
and Gas Corporation Ltd (Sasol) was founded by the state-owned Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC).  Subsequently, the Sasol 1 plant was commissioned in Sasolburg in 1955, using 
the Fischer Tropsch and Kellogg technologies for the production of oil from coal. From the outset, 
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Sasol 1 production benefited from what was effectively a subsidy5 as its products enjoyed tariff 
protection in the amount of 20% of the price of fuel. This support was similar to that previously 
received by SATMAR (Marquard, 2006: 267; Rustomjee et al, 2007: 60). Sasol also enjoyed 
upliftment agreements termed the Main Supply Agreements (MSA). These agreements stipulated 
that 100 percent of the plant’s production would be uplifted by the other oil companies (OOCs) at 
import parity pricing.6  
Thus it can be seen that from the company’s beginning Sasol benefited from extensive support 
from the state. Indeed, Sasol’s ‘founding fathers’ argued that the synthetic fuels producer was ‘of 
such national importance’ that the state should make any concessions necessary to ensure the 
economic health of the industry (Sparks, 2016: 717). While these agreements will be discussed in 
more depth below, it is necessary to note that these agreements were ‘effectively a government-
brokered and sanctioned form of private regulation’ (Competition Tribunal, 2006: 19). It is also 
important to note that the National Party was voted into power in 1948. The significance of this is 
related to the fact that it was this ruling party that subsequently developed close state-industry ties 
and extended support to the liquid fuels producers, as will be demonstrated throughout the study. 
This was perhaps an important stage in the development of South Africa’s modern political 
economy, as the state significantly expanded its role of guiding and protecting the liquid fuels 
industry more broadly, but domestic producers more specifically.  
Also in the early 1950s, Mobil’s Enref refinery was commissioned in Durban. Sasol 1 was 
commissioned the following year, as previously discussed. In the 1960s, the Calref refinery, owned 
by Caltex, and the Sapref refinery, a joint venture between Shell and BP, were subsequently 
commissioned in Cape Town and Durban, respectively (Marquard, 2006: 250).  
In 1969, Natref was formed as a partnership between Sasol, Total7 and the National Iranian Oil 
Company (NIOC). The aim of constructing Natref was to ensure the security of Iranian crude oil 
supplies to South Africa (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 58). Given the need to ensure the supply of crude 
                                                 
5 The WTO was not yet in existence and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade not cover subsidies. However, 
under the ASCM definition of a subsidy, tariff protection would qualify as a subsidy. This is because the system 
effectively increased the price accepted by Sasol above a market-related price. 
6 Although the OECD’s producer support estimate was not yet conceptualised, this amounted to a subsidy to Sasol as 
the regulatory requirement that OOCs uplift Sasol’s production at an import parity price. This is the case due to price 
transfers to Sasol as a result of the pricing formula being in excess of a true import parity price, a fact which is 
discussed further below. 
7 Total entered the South African market as a retailer in 1954. 
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oil from Iran, the most logical location for the refinery would have been in the coastal areas 
(Rustomjee et al, 2007: 58). However, the South African government was also concerned with the 
security of supply in the inland areas. The South African government therefore incentivised Natref 
to construct the refinery at Sasolburg. Natref’s decision in this regard hinged upon the 
government’s undertaking to cover the cost of shipping the crude product inland. This undertaking 
was in order to ensure that Natref would not have to cover additional costs by virtue of being 
located inland, rather than by the coast. Consequently, in 1971, the refinery was commissioned 
(Rustomjee et al, 2007:58). As a result of this inland location, Natref has benefited from generous 
direct and indirect government support over the years, as will be discussed further below 
(Marquard, 2006: 268).  
Finally, in 1965, state-owned Soekor was established for the purpose of oil and gas exploration. 
The establishment of Soekor was related to the state’s recognition of the strategic importance of 
indigenous fuels, due to the oil embargoes against South Africa. Soekor was institutionally linked 
to the South African government’s oil security strategy through its shareholders, the state-owned 
Industrial Development Corporation and Sasol (Marquard, 2006: 287).  
4.1.2. 1970 to 1980 
In 1977, the United Nations imposed a mandatory oil embargo against South Africa. In response, 
government support for the liquid fuels industry expanded as the South African government took 
the decision to ensure the international procurement of crude oil in an attempt to circumvent the 
embargo (Marquard, 2006: 260). By ensuring crude oil supply, the government’s procurement of 
crude oil conferred support to the existing liquid fuels industry. In order to achieve this objective, 
the Strategic Fuel Fund (SFF) was responsible for purchasing crude oil for the South African 
refineries and maintained strategic stockpiles of crude oil at Saldanha Bay and Witbank (Arthur 
Andersen, 1995: 20).  
Also in response to the oil embargo, the South African government pursued the expansion of 
domestic synthetic fuel production. This decision resulted in the subsequent commissioning of 
Sasol 2 and Sasol 3 in 1980 and 1982, respectively (Arthur Andersen, 1995: 16). The State Oil 
Fund (SOF) was instrumental in the development of these projects, as the organisation was 
established to cover the capital costs associated with these projects. This thereby provides evidence 
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of the way in which “institutional arrangements induce complementary organizational forms” 
(Pierson, 2004: 59), ultimately contributing to path dependency.  
As a result, the SOF granted loans to Sasol at favourable interest rates. The total capital cost of 
Sasol 2 was approximately R2 503 million, while Sasol 3 cost an estimated R3 276 million8 (Sasol 
Ltd., 1979: 6; Marquard, 2006: 269). As the SOF loans were provided at interest rates lower than 
what would have otherwise been achieved in the market, this funding amounted to a subsidy to 
Sasol. 9 The split of financing (in nominal rands) for each project can be found in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Sources of Finance for Sasol 2 and 3 
Source of finance Sasol 2 Sasol 3 
SOF Loans R1 711 million R2 096 million10 
Parliamentary grants R300 million - 
Export credits R492 million R525 million 
Sasol 1 privatisation - R655 million 
Total R2 503 million R3 276 million 
(Sasol Ltd., 1979: 6) 
Prior to its privatisation in 1979, Sasol had been in charge of overseeing a number of the state’s 
strategic assets in the liquid fuels sector. These assets included the state’s Strategic Fuel Fund 
(SFF), the State Oil Fund, as well as the Equalisation Fund. That this was the case points to the 
complex interlinkages between the liquid fuels industry actors during this time, as Sasol both 
managed these funds and enjoyed subsidies and other benefits conferred by these funds, as will be 
demonstrated in the following sections. However, when the privatisation of Sasol began in 1979, 
a number of institutional changes occurred. The IDC took over the responsibility of managing the 
funds until 1985, after which time they were combined under a single holding company, the CEF 
Pty (LTD) (Marquard, 2006: 305). At this time, the SOF was also renamed the Central Energy 
Fund. 
                                                 
8  The project was funded in part by ‘… a levy of 2 cents per litre on the relevant fuels’ (Cabinet Minutes 1974 in 
Marquard, 2006: 296). 
9 Provision of loans by government/government actors at below market interest rates falls into the ASCM’s ‘direct 
transfer and potential direct transfer of funds’ subsidy category (see Table 1 in II. Literature Review above) (GSI, 
2010: 4). These loans to Sasol have now been repaid (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 73). 




The board of the CEF consisted of a number of state and industry actors, including representatives 
from the IDC, the Competition Board, the Reserve Bank, the Department of Minerals and Energy 
Affairs, Mobil and Gencor. Due to the fact that CEF was merely a holding company, its operation 
was outsourced to management from the SFF. The SFF was effectively responsible for running 
CEF until the late 1990s. Marquard (2006: 305) notes that much of the management of SFF was 
appointed when the fund was still run by Sasol and were initially Sasol employees. It is important 
to note these arrangements as they further highlight the complex institutional relationships formed 
between the state and the liquid fuels industry. 
A second institution established during this time was the Department of Minerals and Energy 
Affairs (DMEA), initially created in 1980 (DMEA, cited in Fine & Rustomjee, 1996: 97). The 
DMEA was unique in that, for the first time, all mineral and energy related policy functions were 
established within a single entity. Indeed, the newly-formed DMEA consisted of what was 
formerly the energy function of the Department of Environmental Planning and Energy, as well as 
the Electricity Control Board, Escom, and Sasol (until its privatisation) which were initially in the 
Department of Industries. Later that year, the DMEA also incorporated the energy functions of the 
Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs (DMEA, cited in Fine & Rustomjee, 1996: 97). 
4.1.3. 1987 to Present 
In 1987, the South African government took the decision to plan an alternative synthetic fuel plant. 
The project was a gas-to-liquid (GTL) synthetic fuels plant and the plant was commissioned in 
1992. Production from Mossgas enjoyed tariff protection through the Equalisation Fund similar to 
that received by Sasol. Additionally, the other oil companies were also required to purchase the 
full output of the plant. However, whereas synthetic fuels from Sasol were purchased at an import 
parity price, the OOCs agreed to an export price equivalent for production from Mossgas11 
12(Rustomjee et al, 2007: 61). As a result, levies collected through the Equalisation Fund were used 
by the South African government to compensate Mossgas for the difference between the import 
parity price and the export parity price. The implication of this fact was yet further government 
                                                 
11 The export parity price is the price a producer can receive for the product if it is exported. It is equal to the freight 
on board minus the cost of transporting the good from the factory gate to the border. It is therefore lower than the 
import parity price, which includes additional costs related to international transport and tariffs (United States Agency 
for International Development, 2008: 3-4).  
12 Further research is necessary to determine whether the OOCs received subsidies by purchasing Mossgas production 
at an EPP while selling it at an IPP.  
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support to the liquid fuels industry at the expense of consumers13. Although in an altered form, the 
extension of tariff protection to the newly-formed Mossgas is further evidence of the difficulty of 
pursuing alternative policy paths. This is because the existence of the synthetic fuels industry and 
the corresponding institutions built around that industry, as well as the state’s ideological emphasis 
on survival and energy security, demonstrates the way in which “…assemblages of technologies, 
artifacts, bureaucracies, and worldviews inform the course and velocity of development paths” 
(Munck, Rozema, and Frye-Levine, 2014: 642; Burch, 2011:181) which may ultimately lead to 
techno-institutional lock in.  
As Soekor discovered the gas used by Mossgas as its feedstock, it initially received payments from 
Mossgas for these inputs. However, in 1999 the decision was taken to merge the two firms. At this 
time, ‘the payments that previously accrued to a public benefit (Soekor’s oil and gas development 
efforts) became internalised in PetroSA’s [the new company] accounts’ (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 
76). Prior to the merger of the two companies, each received considerable support from the South 
African government and the liquid fuels consumers. The state invested R13 billion in Mossgas and 
R8 billion in Soekor. Subsequently, in 1999, the South African government wrote off loans 
amounting to R7.9 billion and R1.5 billion to Mossgas and Soekor, respectively (Rustomjee et al, 
2007: 182). The history of the relationship between the South African government, Mossgas and 
Soekor has informed the state’s relationship with PetroSA, which is a subsidiary of CEF. Indeed, 
as will be discussed in subsequent sections of this report, the South African government continues 
to extend support to PetroSA.  
The development of the liquid fuels industry and introduction of new actors to the industry over 
time demonstrates the extensive involvement of the South African state in this industry. In the 
earliest stages of the industry, the state offered a number of support measures to the South African 
Torbanite Mining and Refining Company. However, the extent of its involvement in the industry 
and subsidisation of certain actors expanded considerably with the establishment of Sasol in 1947. 
The state’s actions in this regard continued to expand in the 1960s and 1970s with the 
establishment of Natref and Soekor, as well as the development of Sasol 2 and 3. Despite Sasol’s 
                                                 
13 The correct opportunity cost of fuel in the South African market is an import parity price. However, historical 
literature on the import parity pricing system used as the time, the IBLC, notes that this system was in excess of a true 
IPP (Marquard, 2006: 314). This will be discussed further below.  
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privatisation in 1979, state support to the synthetic fuels producer continued in the form of 
subsidies as well as favourable regulations. Many of these support mechanisms were offered 
through state institutions, such as the State Oil Fund, that were developed around the same time 
for the purposes of providing assistance to the synthetic fuels producer. That this was the case 
demonstrates the complex interlinkages between the South African state and the synthetic fuels 
producers as state institutions were developed with the aim of assisting Sasol and protecting the 
company’s interests. Also important during this time was the establishment of the Department of 
Minerals and Energy Affairs in 1980, which was responsible for overseeing many aspects of liquid 
fuels policy and regulation. In the final phase of industry development in terms of the key actors 
and institutions, the state established Mossgas, the gas-to-liquid synthetic fuels producer. Later, 
Mossgas was merged with Soekor to produce PetroSA. Applying the historical institutional 
approach to the development and relationships between the liquid fuels industry actors 
demonstrates the early establishment of the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the 
liquid fuels producers.  
 4.2. Liquid Fuels Policy and Regulatory Developments: 1950s to Present 
Historically, the production of liquid fuels resources has been of great importance to South Africa. 
This emphasis on expanding domestic liquid fuels production arose out of a strategic concern with 
attaining energy self-sufficiency. This self-sufficiency imperative was magnified with the onset of 
sanctions against the apartheid government in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the international 
shocks caused by the global rise in oil prices in 1973 and 1979. Consequently, energy policy-
making in South Africa was driven by the need to ensure the country’s oil and gas self-sufficiency, 
often at the expense of prudent fiscal policy. The implication of this fact is that the liquid fuels 
industry, particularly the synthetic fuels industry, developed with significant financial and 
regulatory support from the South African government.  
This section aims to delve deeper into the mechanisms through which liquid fuels producers have 
received support from the government. Therefore, rather than detailing the development of the 
liquid fuels policy in full, as can be found in Marquard (2006), this section seeks to investigate 
further only those policies and regulations which conferred clear benefits to the liquid fuels 
producers. In doing so, the section also aims to explain the ways in which the institutional 
arrangements developed over time have created a system of interaction between the state and 
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industry which is not easily removed. Applying the historical institutional approach, this section 
argues that the liquid fuels policy and regulatory dispensation created a system of formal and 
informal rules which subsidised or provided other regulatory benefits to the liquid fuels producers. 
These arrangements were often determined and administered through cooperation between the 
state and the petroleum companies and set the stage for the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state 
support to the liquid fuels industry. 
4.2.1. 1950s to 1970s: Defining Market Access and Promoting Indigenous Fuels  
The early development of South Africa’s liquid fuels policies and regulations can be broken up 
into two broad phases. The first phase concerned regulations that were related to defining access 
to the liquid fuels market. In the second phase, the policies and regulations established by the state 
were largely related to the desire to promote indigenous liquid fuels in South Africa. The state’s 
actions in this regard had the outcome of increasing state involvement in the liquid fuels industry 
and increasing cooperation and coordination between the relevant industry actors. Consequently, 
the policy developments during this time established a favourable operating environment for liquid 
fuels producers more broadly, and for the state’s new synthetic fuels producer specifically. 
The development of the state’s liquid fuels policy was first defined by the regulation of the retail 
trade. In 1951, the liquid fuels companies ‘voluntarily’ established the Rationalisation Plans 
(Ratplans), which consisted of a number of informal agreements between the state and industry14. 
The Ratplans aimed to address a number of key issues, including control of the development of 
retail sites and protecting retail profitability, thereby ensuring the survival of smaller sites. The 
Ratplans were also concerned with increasing access to petroleum products in rural areas 
(Rustomjee et al, 2007: 65). Essentially, the plans established procedures for service station 
allocation and therefore distributed market share between the oil majors (Marquard, 2006: 276). 
Additionally, in the 1960’s this plan was used to assist new market entrants in establishing 
marketing networks, as was the case with Total and Trek. Interestingly, and in line with historical 
institutionalist thinking on the processes of institutional adaptation and evolution, this plan has 
more recently been used to assist Black Economic Empowerment companies in entering marketing 
(Rustomjee et al, 2007: 65). Although informal ‘gentleman’s agreements’, the initiation of the 
                                                 
14 The Ratplans were entered into as informal agreements between the oil companies, retailers and the state. The 
Department of Minerals and Energy subsequently entered into the Ratplans (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 57). 
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Ratplans was a key development in the liquid fuels industry as it was among the earliest instances 
of state support to the liquid fuels producers. The informal nature of the agreement was also an 
important characteristic as this was a defining feature of the industry for many decades, as will be 
demonstrated in the following sections.  
In the next phase, the state’s ideological emphasis on self-sufficiency drove the development of 
the synthetic fuels industry and the subsequent policies and regulations which sought to protect 
that industry. In 1954, upliftment agreements were established between Sasol and the OOCs and 
became key pillars of the liquid fuels regulatory dispensation. Although entered into as private 
agreements, they were initiated and facilitated by the South African government. Indeed, designed 
to give preference to Sasol’s synthetic fuels in the inland markets, these agreements were 
‘effectively a government-brokered and sanctioned form of private regulation’ (Competition 
Tribunal, 2006: 19). 
The upliftment agreement between Sasol and the OOCs included the ‘Blue Pump Agreement’, 
which allowed Sasol one petrol pump at OOC branded retail stations.  The rationale for such an 
agreement was related to the fact that, when Sasol 1 began operations in 1954, it did not own any 
service stations from which to market its products. In exchange, Sasol was barred from entering 
the retail market to sell its products through its own sites, thereby allowing the OOCs to maintain 
control of the retail sector and limit competition (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 66).  
During the 1950s and 1960s, local refining capacity expanded with the introduction of four 
refineries, the first being the Mobil (now, Enref) refinery in Durban in 1954. In the 1960s, Caltrex 
commissioned its Calref refinery in Cape Town and the Sapref refinery was commissioned in 
Durban as a joint venture between Shell and BP. Natref was subsequently commissioned in 
Sasolburg in 1971. Imports of crude oil for local fuel refining were limited to the product required 
in excess of local synthetic fuels production capacity, a fact which has historically been a key 
aspect of the regulatory dispensation (Trollip, 1996: 4-19). While for many years the policy was 
unwritten, it was formally sanctioned by the Department of Minerals and Energy in 1995 as the 
‘Crude oil and petroleum products imports and exports policy’ (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 69). The 
one refining facility exempted from this regulation was Sasol’s production from Natref. Similar to 
Sasol’s synthetic fuels, Sasol’s production from Natref enjoyed a guaranteed offtake as a result of 
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a government-facilitated agreement between Natref and the OOCs (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 66). 
That this was the case was due to the fact that Sasol was barred from entering the retail market.  
Despite the limits placed on crude oil import and the favouritism displayed towards synthetic fuels 
production, government’s policy towards the refining industry was overall favourable. Firstly, the 
impact of the emphasis on import substitution was mitigated by the regulatory system which 
increased the refinery margins and allowed refiners to achieve higher returns (Marquard, 2006: 
282). This was largely as a result of the regulated price of petroleum. Indeed, in 1954, an import 
parity pricing system was introduced as the basis for liquid fuels price regulation and was known 
as the In-Bond Landed Cost (IBLC)15. According to Marquard (2006: 263), the introduction of 
regulation on refinery gate price was informed by the state’s desire to encourage industrialisation 
and import substitution. It was also informed by oil companies’ desire to achieve a guaranteed 
return on investing in refining capacity.  
Secondly, locally-refined fuels benefited from a preferential tariff due to the fact that they were 
exempt from a duty imposed on other imported fuels (Van den Burg, cited in Marquard, 2006: 
280). Finally, the local refiners were effectively protected from competition due to state regulations 
limiting the construction and expansion of refineries. These regulations had the effect of protecting 
the oil majors, thereby limiting competition and effectively ensuring the profitability of local 
refining (Marquard, 2006: 280. 
The liquid fuels producers, both domestic and international, benefited from a number of different 
mechanisms built into the developing regulatory system. This was in part informed by the key 
institutions present at the time, including the state’s emphasis on self-sufficiency and state-led 
development. Consequently, the Ratplans were established in 1951 so as to coordinate access to 
the retail market. Subsequently, with the establishment of Sasol 1 in 1954, the state assisted in 
negotiating upliftment agreements between the synfuels producer and the OOCs. The state also 
limited the import of liquid fuels based on market needs and synthetic fuels production capacity. 
As a result of these policy developments, political economy structures were forming through which 
the industry and government developed systems of interaction and cooperation so as to make key 
                                                 
15 The IBLC was calculated as an average of four Free on Board Prices posted from international refineries, plus 
additional charges relating to the hypothetical cost of freight, insurance, leakage and charges for landing in a South 
African port (Marquard, 2006: 263).  
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decisions regarding the market and the regulatory process (Marquard, 2006: 282). Each new policy 
and regulation had the effect of advancing the liquid fuels subsidy regime and setting the liquid 
fuels industry further along the path of state-supported development and growth.  
4.2.2. 1960s to 1990s: The State Oil Security Strategy 
Beginning in the 1960s, the next key process in the development of the liquid fuels policy was the 
state’s pursuit of an oil security strategy. The early steps in this process involved the construction 
of the state-owned refinery, Natref, and the state-owned exploration company, Soekor. Also 
important were the state’s activities in acquiring crude oil, via the Strategic Fuel Fund. 
Concurrently, the state’s commitment to an oil security strategy also gave way to the expansion of 
the synthetic fuels programme, through the construction of Sasol 2 and 3, and later, Mossgas. The 
developments taking place during this phase were often elaborations of previously formed 
institutions and reinforcements of key relationships between the state and industry actors. Further, 
these developments also extended a number of financial and other benefits to the liquid fuels 
producers. The implication of this fact was that each new development reinforced the liquid fuels 
subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry. 
4.2.2.1. Strategic Assets 
Natref, the state-owned crude oil refinery, was established in 1971 following negotiations between 
the IDC, Sasol, the Iranian National Oil Company and Total.  The apartheid government 
incentivised Sasol and Total to construct Natref at an inland location as the government had 
strategic interests in linking it to the state’s strategic storage facility as well an interest in having 
it near high-demand locations. As Sasol took 70% of Natref’s production, the government-
brokered upliftment agreements enjoyed by Sasol 1 were also extended to Sasol’s production from 
the refinery (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 66). The extension of the Main Supply Agreement (MSA) to 
Sasol’s production from Natref demonstrates the way in which institutions experience path 
dependence, which ultimately leading to institutional inertia, as the initial decision to limit Sasol’s 
entry into the retail market subsequently required OOCs to uplift Sasol’s share from an entirely 
new company, Natref. 
Natref’s production enjoyed a number of additional regulatory advantages, largely as a result of 
the incentives provided by government to situate the plant at an inland location. Recall from the 
previous section that the first way in which the government incentivised Natref’s inland location 
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was by agreeing to cover the cost of piping crude oil stock inland (Rustomjee et al, 2007:58). The 
shareholders of Natref enjoyed further benefits within the regulatory framework as a result of the 
way in which pipeline tariffs were applied, which ensured that Natref was no worse off financially 
than it would have been had it been constructed as the coast. As a result of the way in which 
pipeline charges were designed, “crude oil was transported at net cost and the transportation was 
recovered through a complex formula on refined products (Moerane, cited in Rustomejee et al, 
2006: 61). The arrangement was termed the ‘Natref Neutrality Principle’ and  created subsidies in 
the transport tariffs as crude oil was transported to Natref from the coast free of charge (Sparks, 
2016: 721; Crompton, Maule, Mekhlomakulu, Rustomjee and Steyn, 2006: 45)16.   
However, the In-Bond Landed Cost (IBLC) was applied to Natref’s products in such a way that 
the company benefited from additional margins. That is, an additional transport charge was added 
to the standard basic cost of fuel as if Natref had imported crude oil for refining at the plant, which 
in theory compensated the company for piping crude oil from the country’s coast (Marquard, 2006: 
289; Rustomjee et al, 2007: 74). Marquard (2006: 289) notes that this support amounted to a 
subsidy as it was an unregulated administered price determined by a state agency, which allowed 
discretion in determining the price received by Natref. This assessment is correct as the resulting 
price accepted by Natref was higher due to the additional margins described above, which is a 
subsidy that survives to present. 
As previously mentioned, Soekor was established as the state-owned exploration company 
responsible for undertaking and promoting exploration activities. The company was overseen by 
the Department of Mines. Under the Mining Rights Act of 1967, the South African government 
granted Soekor the prospecting lease No.OP26 (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 34). While Soekor was the 
sole recipient of these prospecting rights, the company was permitted to sub-lease these rights to 
international companies. However, interest in this regard was limited due to poor resource 
potential. Later, interest was limited due to sanctions against the apartheid regime. As a result, 
much of the oil and gas exploration and production activities between 1965 and 1997 were 
shouldered by the South African government, acting through Soekor (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 34). 
Funding in this regard was largely in the form of state grants, which were distributed through the 
                                                 
16 This was in place until Transnet replaced the South African Transport Services (SATS), and Transnet at first 
refused to recognise the principle. In 1991, following negotiations between Total, Sasol and Transnet, a variation of 
the principle was agreed upon, which was complied with until 2005 (Transnet v Total, 2016). 
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IDC. In 1985, however, Soekor became a subsidiary of the Central Energy Fund (CEF), which was 
the state-owned energy fund mandated with investing in energy development so as to assist in 
ensuring the country’s energy security. Subsequently, funding by use of grants continued only 
until 1988, after which financial support was extended through the use of loans (Marquard, 2006: 
287). While the total value of financial support to Soekor’s exploration programme is unclear, it 
is estimated to have cost the South African government in the range of R2.35 billion to R2.6 billion 
in expenditure between 1965 and 1994 (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 34; Trollip, 1996: 4-13). Therefore, 
during this period, state efforts to develop a domestic liquid fuels industry entailed a number of 
direct and indirect subsidies to the liquid fuels companies present in the market. 
As previously mentioned, the South African government established the Strategic Fuel Fund in 
1964. In 1977, the Fund was charged with ensuring international procurement of crude oil as a 
result of the embargo against the apartheid regime. This is because the refiners were unable to 
source crude themselves as a result of increasing anti-apartheid sentiments internationally 
(Marquard, 2006: 299). Consequently, the state purchased crude internationally through 
alternative channels, often at a considerable premium. The state then sold the products to the 
refiners at an average international price. To cover the excessive costs related to procuring crude 
products outside the traditional international oil market, the state established the ‘Acquisition 
Equalisation Fund’ (subsequently, the Equalisation Fund). Consequently, the difference between 
the premium paid by government and the price paid by refiners was recovered through an 
additional levy imposed on the price of fuel (Marquard, 2006: 270). Marquard (2006: 300) notes 
that this arrangement had the effect of increasing the close and cooperative relationship between 
the state and the liquid fuels industry. In line with historical institutional thinking on path 
dependent processes, the state’s actions in this regard effectively maintained the industry on the 
path of state-supported development. 
4.2.2.2. Expansion of the Synthetic Fuels Programme 
The 1973 oil crisis triggered the next set of key processes in the development of the state’s oil 
security strategy and liquid fuels policy. Before detailing the policy changes relating to the 
expansion of the synthetic fuels programme, it is important to briefly discuss the changes to the 
way in which the regulated price of liquid fuels was calculated. Prior to this time, the Free on 
Board (FOB) cost was determined based on a basket of prices from four international refineries in 
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the Middle East. When those refineries were nationalised in 1973 and prices from those refineries 
subsequently set by their respective governments, the South African government began using a 
basket of one refinery in Bahrain and three in Singapore so as to determine the FOB market price17. 
That the decision was taken to use Singapore-based refineries has been a subject of contention due 
to the effect it had on the regulated price of petroleum. Firstly, as Lloyd (2001: 17) notes, ‘…there 
is a clear price differential between Singapore and the Arab Gulf of about US$2.80 per 
barrel…indeed, Singapore turns out to be one of the most expensive refining areas from which to 
buy fuel.’ According to Marquard (2006: 265), this produced a difference in price of about 13c/l 
in 1997. Secondly, there was an increase in the shipping component of the IBLC as a result of the 
greater distance between Durban and Singapore than between Durban and the Middle East 
(Marquard, 2006: 265). Taken together, the Singapore reference prices resulted in a regulated price 
that was considerably higher than a true import parity price. Therefore, it is important to note that 
although the basis on which the IBLC was calculated experienced some change, the price of liquid 
fuels continued to be regulated. Consequently, the oil companies continued to receive 
supracompetitive prices. That this is the case provides further evidence of institutional inertia in 
the liquid fuels industry as well as state support to the industry. 
Next, in 1974, the Prime Minister at the time established two key committees which reinforced the 
nature and structure of interactions between the state and industry: the Energy Policy Committee 
(EPM) and the Cabinet Committee on Energy Policy (Marquard, 2006: 294). Representatives of 
the state-owned companies, Sasol and Escom, as well as key government actors, were members of 
the EPC and directly involved in decision making relating to the state’s oil security strategy. In 
this regard, the EPC was responsible for planning and coordinating functions concerning the oil 
security strategy. Accordingly, the EPC was important in the decision to build Sasol 2 and 3 
(through an EPC sub-committee), as well in decision-making concerning longer term strategies 
(Marquard, 2006: 295).  
Following a process of discussions between a sub-committee of the EPC, which included 
representatives of Sasol, the IDC, and the Departments of Trade and Commerce, government took 
the decision to construct Sasol 2. This was a key step in the development of the liquid fuels policy 
17 Marquard (2006: 263) notes that these refineries were owned by the big four oil companies in South Africa at the 
time: BP, Mobil, Shell and Caltex. 
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as it set the state further along its long-term synthetic fuels policy path. Soon thereafter, with the 
United Nation’s implementation of a mandatory oil embargo against South Africa in 1977, 
government took the decision to build Sasol 3. Sasol 2 and 3 were commissioned in 1980 and 
1982, respectively (Crompton et al, 2006: 43). Similar to Sasol 1, additional support provided to 
Sasol for the benefit of Sasol 2 and Sasol 3 included tariff protection as well as upliftment 
agreements through the extension of the MSA (Sparks, 2016: 721; Rustomjee et al, 2007: 60; 
Marquard, 2006: 310). The OOCs uplifted Sasol’s production at the IBLC plus a transport 
premium, which Marquard (2006: 310) notes amounted to a subsidy as a result of the inherent 
premiums built in to the IBLC formula, as well as the fiction of transport differentials.  
Interestingly, this event in the development of the liquid fuels industry demonstrates institutional 
path dependency. The discursive aspect of institutional path dependence is demonstrated by the 
fact that the decision to expand synthetic fuels technology was informed by the dominance of the 
discourse around economic interest, self-sufficiency, and energy security vis- à -vis external 
threats to the apartheid state. The construction and extension of these measures of support to Sasol 
2 and 3 demonstrates institutional path dependency more broadly by sending the South African 
state further along the synthetic fuels development path. Furthermore, as the institutional 
arrangement was already in place for the support of Sasol 1, it can also be argued that this system 
created sunk costs, as the extension of the pre-existing system might have been seen as easier than 
devising an entirely new system to pursue self-sufficiency in the face of sanctions. 
With the introduction of Sasol 2 and 3, the OOCs were required to mothball 30% of their capacity 
and in return received a ‘synlevy’ as compensation from the state. The synlevies were implemented 
in 1984 and funded through fuel levies. Over the 10 years they were in use, the synlevies amounted 
to approximately R1.267 billion (in nominal rands) (Van den Berg, 1993 in Marquard, 2006: 270).  
Finally, the OOCs also benefited through the introduction of the Petroleum Activities Return or 
‘PAR’ mechanism which effectively protected the returns on investment of the OOCs’ marketing 
assets (Competition Tribunal, 2006: 22; Arthur Andersen, 1995: 21).  
Therefore, while state preference was given to the domestic company, Sasol, the OOCs active in 
the liquid fuels industry continued to receive support from government so as to ensure their 
continued presence in the South African market. Government was successful in this regard as the 
combination of compensation from the state, as well as guaranteed gross margins at around a 15% 
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return on assets, prevented the OOCs from disinvesting by ensuring profitability. According to 
Marquard (2006: 311), ‘one senior executive recalled that there was only one year when the South 
African subsidiary’s profit level was the same as the group’s global profit levels; for the rest, South 
African profits were far higher’.  
This financial support was again at the expense of consumers, as the South African government 
collected the synlevy by use of a levy imposed on the price of fuel. That this is the case means that 
this measure can be identified as a market price support subsidy as it resulted in transfers from 
consumers to producers. Alternatively, the adjustments for the PAR were collected through a 
wholesale margin build-up which again increased the retail price of petroleum products 
(Competition Tribunal, 2006: 22). However, this support in the form of a synlevy was discontinued 
in 1993 as a result of growth in the market that enabled the refiners to achieve output levels similar 
to those which prevailed prior to the introduction of domestic synfuels (Arthur Andersen, 1995: 
21).  
The above events indicate the way in which institutional path dependency may arise. It may be 
argued that coordination affects contributed to path dependency in this instance as the OOCs 
benefited financially from cooperating by uplifting Sasol’s production. It also demonstrates 
learning effects, as institutional arrangements identify further, complementary institutions to 
increase the effectiveness of the institutions as a collective. Indeed, the state devised 
complementary institutions to support both Sasol and the OOCs, thereby ensuring that the OOCs 
continued to act as conduits for Sasol’s production to reach the South African consumer. This then 
reduced opposition to the state’s policy of support to Sasol, thereby sending South Africa further 
down the synthetic fuels path. 
 
Just prior to the commissioning of Sasol 2 and Sasol 3, in 1979 Sasol began its first phase of 
privatisation. The company was listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and its terms of 
privatisation were favourable to investors as they limited the risk involved in the investment. 
Indeed, according to the company’s prospectus (Sasol Ltd., 1979: 7; Arthur Andersen, 1995: 34), 
 ‘In considering the economic viability of the Sasol group once the Sasol Two project 
has been complete, the State agreed that for the commercial success of the undertaking 
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in which the public is now being invited to participate, the State will, have to meet two 
requirements to achieve the desired financial results, namely: 
 
(a) An additional protection of 3,6c per litre on all white products, namely liquid 
petroleum gas, petrol, diesel, kerosene, including jet fuel, produced from indigenous 
materials; 
(b) This industry must have the assurance that as international oil prices increase in 
future, the prices of its products will also increase. 
 
These principles have been considered and accepted by the State with the reservation 
that should the ratio between the rise in general cost factors and the rise in the prices 
of petroleum products materially deviate from the assumptions made for the purpose 
of the economic evaluation of the Sasol undertaking the additional protection of 3,6c 
per litre may be adjusted upwards or downwards by the State’. 
 
Therefore, the terms of the prospectus had the effect of locking the South African government into 
ongoing tariff protection. Additionally, the amount paid by the new shareholders of Sasol for the 
company’s privatisation was less than the full value of the company at R2.9 billion. This equated 
to 92% of construction costs for Sasol 2 and Sasol 3, estimated at R3.2 billion (Rustomjee et al, 
2007: 77). Finally, in 1990, the final 50% of Sasol 3 was sold by the CEF using R617 million in 
cash and a CEF loan in the amount of R2.3 billion. This sale was under the agreement that should 
tariff protection be reduced in the future, the interest rate on the loan as well as the capital 
outstanding would also be reduced. Unsurprisingly, the agreement noted that both reductions 
would happen at expense of the government (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 74).  Therefore, in 1993, when 
the synfuels tariff protection was reduced as a result of social unrest caused by hikes in the petrol 
price, the interest on this loan payable by Sasol was simultaneously reduced (Rustomjee et al, 
2007: 73)18.  
                                                 
18 Interesting, the reduction in tariff protection would decrease the value of the tariff protection subsidy to Sasol. 
However, as it was matched with a concurrent reduction in loan interest, this would produce a subsidy as a result of a 
government entity receiving reduced interest payments than what would have otherwise been owed. Further research 
is necessary to determine the net result of these provisions. 
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It is also interesting to note term (b) of the prospectus, ‘this industry must have the assurance that 
as international oil prices increase in future, the prices of its products will also increase’ (Sasol 
Ltd., 1979: 7). As Sasol continues to accept import parity pricing, despite its product being 
produced domestically, it has benefited from a fuel price which is out of line with its cost structure, 
thereby disproportionately benefiting from price regulation.  The implication of this fact is that the 
company has generated excessive profits19 (or economic rent) during times of high international 
oil prices. This point is amplified when one considers that South Africa’s IPP is above a true IPP, 
and therefore higher than the true opportunity cost of the fuel in the South African market (Engen 
Ltd, Sasol Ltd and Petronas International Corporation, 2005: 2957). This support has continued to 
this day, despite the goals for industry deregulation set out in the White Paper on the Energy Policy 
of the Republic of South Africa (Department of Minerals and Energy [DMEA], 1998: 68), as well 
as the task teams established to address these excessive profits (Rustomjee et al, 2007). The fact 
that Sasol continues to accept import parity pricing is in line with historical institutional thinking 
on the difficulties involved in achieving institutional change, particularly when actors have a 
vested interest in maintaining the status quo.  
As discussed in the previous section, Mossgas was commissioned in 1992. The construction of 
Mossgas represented a final step in the state’s oil security strategy and reiterated its commitment 
to a long-term synthetic fuels policy. Additionally, Mossgas’ products enjoyed upliftment by the 
OOC’s similar to that received by Sasol. However, the two agreements differed in that whereas 
Sasol’s products were uplifted at an import parity price, Mossgas’ products were uplifted at an 
export parity or ‘Africa Netback’ price. This price was based on the international market rate and 
was therefore considerably lower than the IBLC. Marquard (2006: 314) notes that this is ironic, 
given that the IBLC was supposedly an import parity price but the Africa Netback was a truer 
reflection of the import parity price.  
It may be argued that the extension of these provisions is simply a reflection of the economic 
necessity to recover the cost of the plant’s construction. While it is important to acknowledge the 
economic and financial considerations underpinning these provisions, the historical institutionalist 
would highlight the importance of increasing returns in path dependency of institutional 
                                                 
19 Excessive profit is used to refer to and economic profit or returns in excessive of the appropriate opportunity cost 
of capital (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 11). 
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arrangements. That is, “institutional arrangements induce complementary organizational forms, 
which in turn generate new complementary institutions” (Pierson, 2000: 255). In the context of the 
South African liquid fuels industry, this is demonstrated by the initial decision to pursue synthetic 
fuels, and the subsequent establishment of other institutions and measures to provide regulatory 
and financial support to sustain that policy path. This demonstrates the way in which, “initial 
investments in a particular path… [in this instance, the synthetic fuels industry]… reverberate into 
the future, making alternative paths increasingly less likely” (Burch, 2011: 184). This is 
particularly important in light of the state’s interests built around the synthetic fuels industry.  
However, in 1993, the state determined that Mossgas should receive an import parity price for its 
products. Accordingly, the CEF transferred a synthetic fuels subsidy to Mossgas similar to that 
received by Sasol. This was a subsidy as it effectively increased the price that Mossgas accepted 
for its products. This subsidy was paid through the Equalisation Fund and therefore at the expense 
of consumers. In addition, a synlevy was paid to the OOCs by the Department of Minerals and 
Energy for ‘mothballing’ production. It is interesting to note that the OOCs did not actually 
mothball capacity, but exported products to make space in the domestic market for production 
from Mossgas20. Thereafter, the synlevy payment was transferred to Mossgas (Marquard, 2006: 
314). Therefore, while Mossgas did not have the same advantages as Sasol in that it did not benefit 
from historically established relationships with state and industry actors, the company enjoyed 
institutions similar to those extended to Sasol.  
In conclusion, a number of significant processes can be identified during this stage of the 
development of the state’s liquid fuels policy. Firstly, the state’s pursuit of an oil security strategy 
led to the establishment of key state-owned assets, including the Natref refinery and the exploration 
company Soekor. It also induced a long term synthetic fuels policy through the expansion of Sasol 
and subsequent development of Mossgas. Importantly, a number of subsidies and other benefits 
were extended to both the synthetic fuels producers and OOCs through the evolving regulatory 
system. This system also established Sasol as a dominant industry actor. Much of the developments 
in this regard were informed by the historical relationship between the state, Sasol and the OOCs 
and were extensions on previously elaborated institutions. The construction of new synthetic fuels 
projects, and subsequent extension of regulatory benefits to these plants, demonstrated the way in 
                                                 
20 This was in place until 1996. 
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which learning and coordination effects lead to institutional path dependent processes. 
Furthermore, the period also demonstrated the discursive aspect of path dependency, due to the 
dominant narrative around survival and security contributing to the decision to continue on the 
synthetic fuels path. Highlighting these state-industry relationships and applying the concepts of 
path dependency, institutional lock in and vested interests explain the endurance of the liquid fuels 
subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry.  
 Figure 1 below provides a timeline of the policy and regulatory developments that have been 
discussed thus far in this chapter, as well as those that will be discussed in the following sections. 
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4.2.3. 1990s to Early 2000s 
A number of important events and processes took place in the next phase of the liquid fuels policy 
development. The early part of this phase was marked by the transition from the apartheid state to 
democracy. As a consequence, new actors were brought to the decision-making table. 
Additionally, the methods and processes of decision making were changed from being informally 
determined and defined by secrecy to being more transparent and formally arranged. These events 
combined to form what a historical institutionalist may define as a ‘critical juncture,’ which created 
a political opening for institutional change within the liquid fuels industry.  However, few 
meaningful changes actually materialised. Rather, the early stage in this phase consisted of changes 
to the petroleum pricing and tariff protection systems, while the broader institutions of petroleum 
price regulation and tariff protection to Sasol remained in place. The next phase, which began with 
the introduction of the White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa, can be 
identified as a period of stasis in the midst of change. Indeed, while the White Paper was the first 
of its kind in the new South Africa, and aimed to lay the way forward to deregulation and an 
overhaul of the liquid fuels market, many of the structures of the previous era remained 
fundamentally unchanged. Applying the historical institutional approach to understand the 
evidence, this section argues that the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid 
fuels industry continued despite the critical juncture represented by the transition to democracy. 
4.2.3.1. Early Changes to the Pricing System and Tariff Protection 
Firstly, in 1990, the Marketing of Petroleum Activities Return (MPAR) replaced the PAR 
mechanism. Similar to the PAR, the MPAR aimed to guarantee the OOC’s returns. However, the 
new mechanism guaranteed returns in the 10-20% range and, additionally, was only applied to 
marketing assets. While this was the case in theory, Rustomjee et al (2007: 70) note that the MPAR 
also indirectly ‘guaranteed’ a return on refining assets.21  
Secondly, a new system of tariff protection was implemented in 1995. The previous system of 
protection functioned between 1989 and 1995 and stipulated that Sasol would receive tariff 
protection from government should the price of oil fall below $23/bbl. While the mechanism did 
not function when the oil price was between $23/bbl and $28.7/bbl, Sasol was to pay 25% of 
                                                 
21 Engen challenged the view that the MPAR extended favoured treatment to the liquid fuels producers. Engen noted 
that a 15% benchmark had also been applied to other regulated industries at the time and, therefore, cannot be viewed 
as favourable treatment to the liquid fuels industry specifically (Engen 2006 in Rustomjee et al, 2007: 70).  
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revenue into the Equalisation Fund should the oil price exceed $28.7/bbl. Accordingly, when the 
dispensation system was changed in 1995 Sasol was obligated to pay R3.7 billion (Rustomjee et 
al, 2007: 109). However, as this new system did not include a government instrument to collect 
Sasol’s deficit, the synfuels company did not repay its remaining balance into the Equalisation 
Fund. The non-payment of this balance effectively amounted to a subsidy to Sasol, as a result of 
government revenue foregone. Indeed, in the 2007 response from National Treasury to the Task 
Team, the report confirms that Cabinet, ‘effectively released Sasol from the obligation to repay 
any outstanding subsidies received during the Pim Goldby era in 1998, provided it continued to 
develop the petrochemicals sector’ [emphasis added] (National Treasury, 2007: 3). However, no 
evidence was found to indicate that Sasol has made any major investments in expanding refining 
capacity. 
Despite the fact that Sasol did not repay its deficit into the Equalisation Fund, the company 
continued to enjoy protection for its synfuels. When the new system of protection commenced in 
1996, the South African government and Sasol agreed that tariff protection would continue should 
the price of oil fall below $16/barrel (Roberts and Rustomjee, 2010: 64). In return for this 
protection, Sasol agreed to create 50,000 sustainable jobs in the downstream sector. However, in 
1999, when the protection system was again reviewed and subsequently phased out, Sasol had not 
yet succeeded in honouring its commitment. The total value of the subsidy to Sasol resulting from 
tariff protection between 1980 and 1994 is estimated at R14.1 billion in 2000 rands (Trollip, 1996 
in Marquard, 2006: 268). Therefore, while the institutions used to protect Sasol have changed over 
time, Sasol and the synfuel industry have historically benefited from undue support from the South 
African government. This support was ostensibly offered to Sasol in exchange for employment 
and petrochemicals development, reflecting the persistent narrative of Sasol as instrumental to the 
South African economy and energy security, however these outcomes did not materialise.  
A third major development during this time relates to the regulation of petroleum prices. Since 
1954, petroleum prices have been regulated by the South African government and have been 
determined based on the price of importing the fuel. Additional costs associated with transporting 
the products to their final location with South Africa are also levied (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 68). 
Initially, the In Bond Landed Cost (IBLC) was used to attract multinational companies to South 
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Africa. The IBLC was subsequently used to incentivise the companies to remain in the country by 
ensuring the profitability of the industry.  
However, in the early 1990s, a Liquid Fuels Industry Task Force (LFITF) was established as a 
result of mounting political pressure from consumers and was responsible for addressing the 
supracompetitive regulated price of petroleum The LFITF first pursued a short-term solution 
aimed at achieving price reductions. To this end, an agreement was reached between Sasol and the 
OOCs that the producers would split the cost of the reduction by reducing the petrol price 
(Marquard, 2006: 318). As a longer term solution, the LFITF determined that the process of price-
setting would be determined by a transparent formula, which was important as the process by 
which the price was previously set by government was not transparent. Further, the LFITF 
recommended that this formula should be updated on a regular basis to reflect changes in the 
international oil market. Finally, the LFITF concluded that it was necessary to reevaluate the IBLC, 
which had long been considerably higher than the true import parity price. Thus, for the almost 60 
years that the IBLC was used, the liquid fuels industry was propped up at the expense of South 
African motorists (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 78). These changes will be discussed in depth in the 
following chapter. The incremental changes to the pricing and tariff protection systems were 
elaborations on the preexisting institutions and set the industry further along the path of 
subsidisation and support from the South African state, thereby reflecting path dependency and 
institutional lock in. 
4.2.3.2. Stasis in the Midst of Change 
The next key event in South Africa’s energy policy development concerns the formulation of the 
1998 White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa. Firstly, the White Paper 
noted that one of the important milestones to be reached before deregulation was, ‘mutually 
acceptable agreements between synfuel producers and the marketers of crude oil based fuels on 
the upliftment and marketing of synfuels’ (Department of Minerals and Energy [DMEA], 1998: 
71). In light of this, it can be argued that the South African government continued to play an 
important role in ensuring the upliftment of synfuels, even after the transition to democracy. 
With regards to oil and gas exploration, the White Paper committed government to ensuring a 
stable and attractive tax regime and regulatory environment so as to promote the development of 
oil and gas resources in South Africa. Associated with this, the White Paper also emphasised 
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government’s role in promoting research and development relating to oil and gas exploration and 
production (DMEA, 1998: 64). The significance of these commitments will be revisited in the 
following section concerned with post-2003 developments. 
Finally, the White Paper was also significant in that its liquid fuels component called for a phased 
approach to deregulation (DMEA, 1998: 70). This process would proceed in three phases; the first 
phase would involve the presence of historically disadvantaged South Africans in the liquid fuels 
market in addition to governmental monitoring of the industry; in the second phase price 
regulation, import control and the Ratplan would be removed and; the third phase would be a ‘post-
regulation transition phase’ in which the industry would be monitored and corrective action would 
be taken where necessary (DMEA, 1998: 70-71).  
For the historical institutionalist, this commitment may represent the potential opening for change 
to previously entrenched institutions. Such an assumption would not be unreasonable given the 
political rupture represented by the end of the apartheid regime and subsequent transition to 
democracy – what the historical institutionalist would refer to as a ‘critical juncture’. However, 
Marquard argues that subsequent policy actions were more in line with a process of ‘re-regulation,’ 
rather than deregulation (Marquard, 2006: 324). That is, rather than completely scrapping the 
regulatory dispensation inherited from the apartheid era, there was a process of formalising the 
pre-existing arrangements. Firstly, rather than deregulating the price of liquid fuels, in 2003 the 
IBLC was replaced by the Basic Fuels Price (BFP). The new pricing formula was intended to be a 
more accurate representation of an import parity price. Indeed, while the BFP consists of many of 
the same elements included in the IBLC, the BFP was perceived to have resulted in prices 
approximately 6c/l lower than those determined by the IBLC (PetroSA, 2006 in Rustomjee et al, 
2007: 68). Also in 2002, the price of diesel underwent some deregulation, as it was determined 
that the retail price of diesel would no longer be regulated. The wholesale price, however, remains 
regulated (Department of Energy [DOE], 2016). 
The process of re-regulation also included the implementation of the 2005 Petroleum Product 
Amendment Act, in order to direct the Department of Minerals and Energy-administered licensing 
process. Indeed, this policy was introduced as a replacement to the Ratplan.   
While the MSA was in fact removed, this was a result of Sasol’s own actions, rather than 
government-led action to rid the industry of anti-competitive agreements. In 1998, Sasol provided 
47 
the five years notice that was necessary to terminate the agreement (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 67). 
As the termination of the MSA represented a major institutional change within the liquid fuels 
regulatory regime, it will be discussed further in the following chapter concerning major instances 
of institutional change and inertia22. 
Finally, in 2000, the subsidy to synthetic fuels was successfully phased out. However, due to the 
high international price of crude oil, the subsidy had not been in function at the time (Marquard, 
2006: 324). A primary reason for the removal of the subsidy was that the United Nations lifted the 
sanctions on South Africa. However, Trollip (1996: 4-28) notes that the decision to phase out the 
subsidy to Sasol was also informed by the actions of the South African oil refineries, represented 
by the South African Petroleum Industries Association (SAPIA). SAPIA claimed that while Sasol 
earned a 12.7% after tax return on total assets excluding cash, their members earned only 6.8%23. 
While SAPIA has its own vested interests, if this is true,  it provides further evidence of the 
additional support extended to the synthetic fuels producers. It also provides evidence that Sasol 
no longer required this financial support as it was sufficiently profitable. 
The key events during this phase in the development of the state’s liquid fuels policy do not point 
to evolution or change, as would be expected given the massive political rupture represented by 
the end of apartheid and transition to democracy. Rather, many of the institutions remained 
essentially unchanged. While the IBLC was reduced and reconstituted to be a BFP, the fuel price 
continued to be regulated. As a result, the price was still higher than it would otherwise be in 
absence of regulation (Competition Tribunal, 2006: 26). The Ratplan, a defining feature of the 
regulatory framework during the apartheid era was also reconfigured into a formal regulation, the 
Petroleum Products Act. The few changes which did occur, including the end of the MSA between 
Sasol and the OOCs and the synthetic fuels subsidies, were either a result of industry action, rather 
than government, or were already moot by the time they were removed. Similar to the two phases 
which came before it, this phase of policy development demonstrates both the continued support 
22 On the other hand, PetroSA, the state oil company formed through the merging of Mossgas and Soekor, continues 
to enjoy upliftment agreements for its products. The initial upliftment agreements ended in 2007 and were 
subsequently renegotiated (Engen Ltd, Sasol Ltd and Petronas International Corporation, 2005: 1773). 
23 No response from Sasol on this matter was found. An attempt to estimate the after tax returns would require financial 
data from the relevant parties, which is not easily accessed, and is beyond the scope of this study. 
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extended to the liquid fuels industry as well as the issue of institutional inertia undermining the 
possibility of fundamental change.  
4.2.4. 2003 to Present 
Similar to the stages before it, the next phase of energy policy development demonstrates the 
state’s interest in ensuring the security of supply. However, whereas the previous stage in the 
history of the liquid fuels industry was largely concerned with developments in the midstream 
liquid fuels regulations, this stage is largely concerned with the upstream industry. Accordingly, 
the early part of this stage demonstrates the state’s overwhelming focus on incentivising liquid 
fuels exploration and production. As the purpose of integrated energy planning is to inform both 
energy policy development and the relevant regulatory framework, a useful starting place for this 
section is the 2003 Integrated Energy Plan. Subsequently, the state introduced the Tenth Schedule 
to the Income Tax Act in 2006, aimed at incentivising oil and gas exploration and production in 
the country. This has been followed by other incentive measures built into the oil and gas tax 
regime. The final change in this stage occurred in 2013, with an adjustment to the way in which 
margins are determined in the petroleum industry, which had an impact on the Basic Fuel Price. 
Despite the major political change represented by South Africa’s transition to democracy, this 
section argues that the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry 
have continued. 
 
In 2003, South Africa published its first Integrated Energy Plan (IEP), as called for in the White 
Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa (DMEA, 1998: 83). The purpose of 
integrated energy planning is to outline a framework within which developments in energy supply 
can balance those in future energy demand. Consequently, it is used to inform energy policy and 
regulations. Notably, the conclusions of the 2003 IEP reiterated the 1998 White Paper’s emphasis 
on the importance of tapping into South Africa’s oil and gas resources (although believed to be 
limited at the time). That is, the IEP called for an expansion to oil and gas exploration measures 
(Department of Minerals and Energy [DMEA], 2003: 26). 
It is within this environment – the White Paper’s commitment to oil and gas exploration and 
production and the subsequent emphasis on expanded measures in the IEP – that the state 
introduced the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. Prior to its introduction in 2006, the tax 
regime applicable to oil and gas companies was governed by the OP26, granted in 1965. The OP26 
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consisted of the OP26 prospecting lease, the OP26 mining lease as well as the OP 26 mining 
subleases. The exact details of the OP26 were long unknown to the public due to the secrecy and 
lack of transparency that has historically surrounded the liquid fuels industry. However, it is now 
known that it contained a number of tax incentives for oil and gas companies, including a tax 
stabilization regime and full deduction of capital expenditure relating to prospecting 
(‘exploration’) and mining (‘production’)24 (Futter, 2010: 43).  
Notably, the Tenth Schedule grants a 200% super deduction of capital expenditure in respect of 
exploration. Conversely, capital expenditure in respect of production benefits from a 150% super 
deduction. These super deductions act as tax incentives to companies to invest in oil and gas 
exploration and production in South Africa and effectively reduce the cost of producing oil and 
gas below that which would prevail under a standard tax treatment. For companies that access 
these measures for specific projects, the most common approach to calculating the value of the 
subsidy is measuring the difference between the tax liability under the preferential measures and 
the tax liability that would be owed under a standard tax treatment (Bruce, 1990 13), which 
amounts to the government revenue foregone25. Although the value of these incentives is not easily 
calculated due to lack of detailed financial information on the relevant companies, these measures 
result in subsidies to these companies accessing them for the exploration and production of oil and 
gas as they result in government revenue foregone. Furthermore, as many of these incentives were 
carried over from the previous taxation regime, the transition from the OP26 to the Tenth Schedule 
of the Income Tax Act provides yet further evidence of the difficulties involved in removing 
entrenched institutions. This is particularly the case when state and industry actors have an interest 
                                                 
24 Due to a lack of information on company-specific costs and a corresponding lack of data on the government revenue 
foregone as a result of these provisions, it is unclear which companies claimed these deductions and what the total 
value of the deductions were.  
25 An alternative view is to argue that the tax subsidy should be identified and measured on the basis of whether the 
project would have proceeded in the absence of the tax provision. The idea behind such an argument is that, if the 
project would not have proceeded in the absence of the provision, then it cannot be counted as a subsidy as the 
government generates from the project tax revenues which it otherwise would not have received. However, the 
challenge with this approach is that, from the outside, it is not always possible to know whether a company would 
have proceeded with the project in the absence of the provision. Other approaches argue for the inclusion of 
behavioural changes caused by the introduction or removal of favourable tax provisions, although these methods are 
complex and require estimation of critical elasticities. Consequently, the present study follows much of the 
international subsidies literature in identifying and measuring tax subsidies on the basis on government revenue 
foregone, which is favoured for its practicality and ease of use (Kojima and Koplow, 2015: 27; OECD, 2013: 32). 
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in promoting resource nationalism and maintaining the status quo. The tax provisions resulting in 
subsidies to oil and gas producers  will be discussed in more depth in the following chapter. 
Additionally, in 2012, new legislation was introduced which aimed to stimulate research and 
development in oil, gas and mineral exploration. Indeed, expenditure on exploration-related 
research and development enjoys a tax deduction in the amount of 150% of the investment 
(KPMG, 2013: 1). Similar to the previous deductions allowed through the Tenth Schedule, this 
super deduction reduces the amount of government revenue collected and therefore amounts to a 
subsidy to oil and gas companies carrying out these activities. Furthermore, the introduction of 
this incentive should be considered in connection with the other favourable tax regulations enjoyed 
by the liquid fuels industry, first set out in the OP26 and subsequently embodied in the Tenth 
Schedule. This then provides further evidence of the difficulty involved in pursuing an alternative 
path arising out of the continued incentives offered to the liquid fuels producers.  
Finally, in 2013, the Department of Energy introduced the regulatory accounting system (RAS) so 
as to determine appropriate margins for wholesale, storage, handling and distribution in the 
petroleum industry26. The RAS is based on assets and aimed to introduce transparency into the 
liquid fuels industry and to reduce excessive costs and inefficiencies (Steyn, 2013). The reason for 
the introduction of the RAS was that the previous structure was believed to inflate the costs of 
marketing and operating. It was also believed to encourage over-investment in the retail industry.  
This was due to the fact that the previous system set prices based on aggregated costs, as submitted 
by wholesalers and retailers. This implication of this was that consumers covered the cost of value 
chain inefficiencies (Steyn, 2013). That the previous system encouraged over investment in service 
stations is unsurprising as the Department of Energy had previously noted in 2006 that there were 
30% more retail stations in the market than necessary (Engen Ltd, Sasol Ltd and Petronas 
International Corporation, 2005: 1770). However, while the new system resulted in lower margins 
for the petroleum wholesalers, it aimed to achieve a simultaneous increase in margins for retailers. 
The retailing segment of the value chain is important as it is the segment that includes a number 
of new entrants, particularly a number of Black Economic Empowerment entrants. It is therefore 
interesting to question whether the introduction of the RAS was in part aimed at assisting these 
                                                 
26 The introduction of the RAS began in 2010. The transitional process took over two years, until it was fully 




relatively newer players. While the introduction of the RAS signaled a change to the calculation 
of the basic fuel price, the broader institution of regulating the price of petroleum remained in 
place. The state’s interests in assisting new BEE entrants provides further evidence of the way in 
which vested interests can undermine the removal of institutions despite calls for deregulation 
following the transition to democracy. 
The final stage in the development of the state’s liquid fuels policy began with developments 
concerned largely with the upstream liquid fuels sector. Following the introduction of the 
Integrated Energy Plan, which emphasised the importance of supporting exploration, the state 
reformed the tax regime applicable to the oil and gas industry. The Tenth Schedule to the Income 
Tax Act, which was the newly formed tax regime, in many ways retained the most favourable 
provisions of the former tax regime. Additionally, the state subsequently introduced favourable 
tax legislation aimed at promoting research and development in the liquid fuels industry. The final 
changes in 2013 were again concerned with regulations in the midstream sector and changed the 
ways in which margins are determined in the petroleum industry’s wholesale, storage, handling 
and distribution steps in the value chain, with regulation allowing rent seeking for new and existing 
players in the retail market. The institutional inertia evidenced by these examples demonstrates the 
way in which the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry have 
continued despite major political change.  
4.2.5. Conclusion 
A review of the development of the policies and regulations applicable to the liquid fuels industry 
demonstrates the issue of institutional inertia in the industry, as well as the way in which the 
industry developed with assistance from the South African government. The early stage of the 
industry was largely concerned with defining market access for industry players and assisting in 
the development of domestic liquid fuels production, particularly with regards to synthetic fuels. 
The next stage was concerned the state’s energy security strategy and lead to the development of 
a number of new institutions. Many of these actors and institutions were designed to support the 
development and success of liquid fuels production and liquid fuels producers, reflecting the way 
in which institutions come together to form a complementary, reinforcing arrangement. 
Furthermore, preexisting institutions, such as the Main Supply Agreement, were extended to new 
producers that entered the market. This thereby demonstrated the way in which institutions may 
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become entrenched over time. The following two stages occurred during and after the transition to 
democracy. While new policies emphasised the need to change and deregulate the liquid fuels 
industry, the subsequent policy and regulatory changes were more in line with a process of 
reregulation. For instance, while the basis on which the import parity price was determined 
underwent some change with the transition to the Basic Fuel Price, the broader institution of price 
regulation remained in place. Similarly, in the final stage of the industry’s development, the liquid 
fuels tax regime transitioned from the OP26 to the Tenth Schedule. However, the favourable 
aspects of the former tax regime were retained in the new regime. Therefore, applying the concepts 
of historical institutionalism demonstrates the way in which liquid fuels industry advanced further 
along the path of subsidisation and support from the South African state, despite the major political 
change represented by the end of apartheid and subsequent transition to democracy.  
V. Major Instances of Change and Inertia: An Analysis
The usefulness of historical institutionalism in attempting to understand and explain instances of 
institutional inertia should be apparent following the discussion in the previous chapter. Through 
reference to the concept of a ‘critical juncture’, however, historical institutionalism has also been 
used to understand and explain institutional change. One way in which a critical juncture may 
appear is through regime change. South Africa’s shift to democracy in 1994 represented a critical 
juncture, creating an opening for major institutional change in the liquid fuels industry. This is 
particularly so given the industry’s close ties to the apartheid state. However, this was not the case 
as most of the ‘major’ changes in the liquid fuels industry following the transition to democracy 
were incremental, rather than fundamental. Furthermore, many of these changes retained the 
fundamental aspects of those institutions, rather than replaced them. These types of processes are 
evidenced in the case of industry regulation, the state’s failure to impose a windfall tax on Sasol 
as well as the transition to the Tenth Schedule of the Income Tax Act. Alternatively, Sasol’s 
termination of the Main Supply Agreement was a major instance of institutional change, although 
it is important to note that there was no major political opposition and it did not affect the 
company’s profitability. Applying the institutional historical approach to the instances of 
institutional inertia and change, this chapter argues that the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state 
support to the liquid fuels industry have continued despite the major political change represented 
by the end of apartheid. 
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5.1. Major Actors 
In addressing major instances of institutional inertia and change following the transition to 
democracy, an important first step is identifying the relevant actors involved in each case. Such a 
discussion also allows for a preliminary understanding of each actor’s interests. This thereby 
improves insight into the political economy environment in which decisions are made. That is, it 
provides insight into the interaction of political and economic processes and the ways in which 
important actors in government and industry impact on the decision making process. Identifying 
and understanding the roles and interests of relevant actors, as well as relationships between actors, 
is an important first step in understanding the dynamics informing institutional inertia and change, 
as well as state support to the liquid fuels industry.  
The Department of Minerals and Energy (DMEA), as well as its associated entities, were important 
actors in the maintenance of industry regulation and the continuation of import parity pricing. As 
previously discussed, the Department of Minerals and Energy was established in 1980. The DMEA 
was charged with multiple responsibilities, the first of which was regulating the price of fuel. The 
DMEA was also responsible for regulating liquid fuel imports and maintaining service levels in 
the liquid fuels industry. Finally, the DMEA was responsible for policy making in the industry 
(Marquard, 2006: 259)27. In 1993, in response to protests over increases in the price of petrol, the 
DMEA established a Liquid Fuels Industry Task Force (LFITF). The LFITF was charged with 
determining an appropriate and politically acceptable approach to setting the price of liquid fuels, 
as well as negotiating a new regulatory framework for the liquid fuels industry. However, the 
LFITF’s success in achieving the latter goal was limited, in part due to actions on the part of the 
DMEA. The inability of the DMEA and the LFITF to reach an agreement on the future of the 
liquid fuels industry has in part informed the continuation of import parity pricing and industry 
regulation more broadly. 
Although not directly involved in the termination of the Main Supply Agreement (MSA), it is 
useful to briefly mention the Competition Commission. This is because the termination of the 
MSA may have been in part informed by the introduction of competition law in 1998, although 
the Commission itself questions this motive (Competition Tribunal, 2006). Therefore, a brief 
                                                 
27 However, policy making in the synthetic fuels industry was concentrated in the Department of Commerce and 
Industry (Marquard, 2006: 259). 
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discussion of the Competition Commission is also important as this was the actor that assessed 
Sasol’s motives in terminating the MSA.  The Competition Commission shed light on Sasol’s 
interests which may have remained in the dark in the absence of the 2006 Competition Tribunal.   
Also an important actor was the office of the Ministry of Finance and its associated departments. 
These actors were important in the decision making process across multiple instances of change 
and inertia. Included in the Minister of Finance’s portfolio is the National Treasury, which is 
responsible for the South African government’s financial affairs. Also included is the South 
African Revenue Service (SARS), which is responsible for collecting and administering national 
taxes. Both of these departments were important in determining policy and regulatory outcomes 
in the instances discussed below. In particular, these various departments were important in the 
decision against imposing a windfall tax on Sasol as well as in the establishment of the Tenth 
Schedule to the Income Tax Act. Interestingly, while these actors are charged with ensuring the 
financial performance of the state, the instances under investigation seem to suggest that these 
actors repeatedly capitulated to the interests of the liquid fuels producers. As will be discussed, 
these actors were important in choosing not to impose a windfall tax on Sasol, as well as in setting 
favourable taxes for the liquid fuels industry more broadly. 
Finally, it is necessary to briefly discuss the relevant industry actors. With regards to the synthetic 
fuels producers, the instances of institutional change and inertia are largely focused on the role and 
interests of Sasol. The other oil companies (OOCs) are also important, although they will primarily 
be discussed as a group, having broadly similar interests, rather than as individual actors. While 
the interests of these actors converged during the early stages of the liquid fuels industry, further 
investigation into the major instances of change and inertia following the transition to democracy 
reveals that the synthetic fuel producer’s interests diverged from those of the other oil companies 
active in the industry. 
As will be demonstrated the following sections, the functions and interests of these actors impacted 
on the outcomes of institutional change and inertia in the cases under investigation. This then 
allows for a better understanding of the factors sustaining the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state 
support to the liquid fuels industry despite the major political change represented by the 
introduction of democracy in South Africa. 
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5.2. Industry Regulation and the Continuation of Import Parity Pricing 
The history of the South African liquid fuels industry has shown repeated instances of institutional 
inertia. One area in which this has been most evident is in the continuation of industry regulation 
and import parity pricing more specifically. That this is the case is particularly interesting in light 
of the emphasis that the newly democratic state placed on industry deregulation. In further 
investigating this instance of institutional inertia, it is useful to begin in the early 1990s. This was 
when the debate regarding deregulation came to the fore. In doing so, the roles and interests of 
different actors will be discussed so as to explain the challenges involved in reaching an agreement 
on industry deregulation. The next stage in the debate began with the 1998 White Paper on the 
Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa, which established as policy the government’s 
intention to deregulate the industry. However, the events following the White Paper did not 
produce significant institutional change. Indeed, while the transition to the Basic Fuel Price (BFP) 
represented an incremental institutional change from the In Bond Landed Cost (IBLC), the 
maintenance of the regulated petrol price and of industry regulation provides evidence of 
institutional inertia and the continuation of the status quo. Using the historical institutional 
approach to understand and explain this case, this section argues that vested interests, path 
dependent processes and perceptions of sunk costs explain the endurance of the liquid fuels 
subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry following the transition to democracy 
Before discussing the maintenance of import parity pricing and the transition to the BFP, it is 
useful to delve into a series of important events in the 1990s which preceded this transition. This 
discussion will provide preliminary insight into the political economy environment informing 
important decisions. Additionally, it traces the key historical events preceding the transition to the 
BFP, which is an important step in applying the historical institutional approach. In 1993, a 
Competition Board was commissioned to investigate the liquid fuels industry following the 
removal of the secrecy provisions that had previously clouded the industry. The Competition 
Board determined that the liquid fuels industry was ‘fundamentally anti-competitive’ and 
recommended that the Ratplan and petrol price regulation be removed (Marquard: 2006: 316). 
Indeed, the Competition Board noted that the introduction of competition in other locations had 
reduced prices paid by consumers considerably.  
However, prior to the conclusion of the Competition Board’s investigation, the Department of 
Minerals and Energy Affairs (DMEA) provided a report to Cabinet. In this report, the DMEA 
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argued that it was not possible to deregulate specific parts of the industry. The DMEA also argued 
that the deregulation of certain elements of the system was problematic as a change to the current 
system of regulation could not guarantee that the country would be better off over all (DMEA, 
cited in Marquard, 2006: 316). Consequently, in July 1993, the Cabinet determined that the liquid 
fuels industry would not undergo any deregulation. Although no conclusion can be reached in this 
regard, it is interesting to question whether deregulation was not pursued as this was perceived as 
a threat to the interests of the DMEA itself, as one of the Department’s primary functions was to 
regulate the liquid fuels industry. 
In September 1993, minibus taxi associations began protesting in response to a 7c/l rise in the price 
of petrol28. These early protesters were then joined by trade unions, in their capacity as petrol 
consumers. The increase in the price of petrol at the time was informed by the need to increase the 
retail and wholesale margins as well as a decline in the exchange rate (Crompton, 1998: 3). Prior 
to this increase, Crompton (1998: 3) notes that there had been three petrol price increases in the 
amount of 8c/l, 7c/l and 15 c/l. The resulting 30c/l increase produced a 21% increase in the price 
of petrol. Consequently, the protests were targeted at the recent increases in price as well as the 
secretive and unilateral ways in which the petroleum prices were determined (Marquard, 2006: 
317).  
As the protests succeeded in causing a political crisis for the apartheid state29, government 
established a Liquid Fuels Industry Task Force (LFITF) to address the issue. The Task Force was 
responsible for determining a more politically acceptable petroleum pricing system as well as 
establishing a new regulatory framework (Marquard, 2006: 317). In response to the first objective, 
the LFITF proposed to the South African government that the petrol price be decreased by 2c/l. 
The cost of this reduction was borne by Sasol and the OOCs (Crompton, 1998: 6) and Table 3 
below indicates the way in which this 2c/l reduction was produced. However, Marquard notes that 
it is unclear whether these parties actually lost out as a result of the reduction in the petrol price. 
The lack of clarity in this regard was due to the opaque way in which the 2c/l reduction was 
                                                 
28Minibus taxi associations in particular were frustrated with this price increase as they were unable to pass these 
increases along to customers, who often boycotted taxis in response to fare increases (Crompton, 1998: 4).  
29 At the time, the Congress of South African Trade Unions was beginning to take part in determining economic 
policy and was also angered about being excluded on the issue of petrol pricing and what it believed to be a 
unilateral price increase (Crompton, 1998: 4). Crompton notes that Labour called for ‘accountable and transparent 
government now and not just in the future’ (Minutes of meeting of 17 September 1993 in Crompton, 1998: 4). 
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extracted through levy payments, which funded the synfuel and mothballing subsidies, and 
funneled to the beneficiaries through the Central Energy Fund. Therefore, Marquard argues, it is 
not clear whether Sasol and the OOCs lost out in the long run due to the fact that the changes 
affected the collection mechanism, rather than the payment mechanism for these measures of 
support (Marquard, 2006: 318). 
Government ultimately agreed to this proposal, thereby reducing the magnitude of the immediate 
political crisis. Also as a means of alleviating the crisis, from November 1993 to April 1994, the 
South African government transferred the responsibility for setting the petrol price to the LFITF.  
Table 3: Breakdown of the 2c/l Reduction 
Item Share of price reduction 
Sasol: Synfuel tariff protection (subsidy) reduction 0.65 c/l  
CEF: Sasol loan commitment reduction 0.7 c/l  
Synfuels tariff protection reduction  1.3 c/l 
Oil companies: synfuel levy reduction  0.7 c/l 
Total  2.0 c/l 
(Crompton, 1998: 6) 
In response to the Task Team’s second mandate – determining a more sustainable approach to 
setting the price of petroleum – the LFITF proposed two key solutions. Firstly, the LFITF 
recommended that the IBLC should be reassessed as it was above the competitive rate and granted 
benefits to the producers of liquid fuels. Key changes in this regard were reform to the refineries 
used to determine the IBLC. This was important as the refineries previously used to determine the 
regulated price were refineries owned by the OOC’s operating in South Africa. Marquard notes 
that this was a significant change as there was a rumour that the oil majors owning these refineries 
used the refineries’ posted prices to increase South Africa’s regulated price. Therefore, the new 
refineries were considered to be more ‘neutral’ (Marquard, 2006: 318). Additionally, the shipping 
component was changed to reflect the rates of more appropriately-sized shipping vessels. There 
was also a shift from basing petroleum prices purely on the posted prices to a combination of 80% 
posted prices and 20% spot prices.  The value of these adjustments and further alterations are 
captured in Table 4 below. Crompton (1998: 12) notes that these adjustments were structural in 
nature and produced a sustainable reduction to the price of petrol. 
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For their part, the oil companies did not appear to be happy with the changes to reduce the petrol 
price. Crompton (1998: 11) notes that in January 1994 the oil companies started to demand a 2.3c/l 
increase in the price they received for petrol, which they claimed they were owed since January 
1993. According to the OOCs, they were owed these payments, which amounted to a total cost of 
R350 million, in terms of the MPAR formula.  Alternatively, during this time, subsidy payments 
to Sasol were approximately R120 million per month. According to Crompton, this was a 
contributing factor to the tension between the OOCs and the synthetic fuels producer (1998: 11). 
Secondly, the LFITF recommended that the process of determining petroleum prices should be 
removed from government oversight. Instead, the price should be determined by a transparent 
formula that would be regularly and automatically adjusted in response to changes in the import 
parity price (Marquard, 2006: 318). Consequently, the subsequent increases in the petrol price in 
1994 did not spark as much outrage as the September 1993 increase. Indeed, removing the 
determination of petrol prices from the hands of government depoliticised the process thereby 
making it more difficult to blame the government for any price increases (Crompton, 1998: 3-4).  
According to Marquard (2006:318), these changes achieved their goal of establishing a more 
politically palatable method of determining prices. This is because the changes were successful in 
reducing the impact of price increases and collectively had a sustainable impact on the price of 
petrol by structurally revising the pricing formula. However, these changes can only be seen as 
incremental changes, adding on to, but not significantly altering, the institution of petrol price 
regulation. The implication of this fact is that these changes maintained the industry on the path of 
industry regulation.  
Table 4: Adjustments and Associated Retail Price Reductions 
Adjustment Reduction in retail price (c/l) 
Shift to 80% contract and 20% spot prices and adjustment to 
shipment container size 
1.5 
Synfuel subsidy reduction 0.39 
Petronet tariff reduction 1.0 
Equalisation Fund Levy reduction 3.6 
Sub Total 6.49 
(Crompton, 1998: 11) 
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With regards to its second mandate, the experience of the LFITF in reforming the regulatory 
regime was complicated by a number of issues in the political economy of the liquid fuels industry. 
The first issue was related to the difficulties of achieving a consensus on a policy framework after 
the transition from apartheid. This was due to ideological differences of the relevant actors 
concerning the question of regulation versus deregulation. An additional complication was created 
by the division between the synthetic fuels producers and the other oil companies due to the 
uncertainty raised by the creation of the new regulatory system and their relative positions within 
that system (Marquard, 2006: 318). Therefore, whereas the interests of the liquid fuels producers 
had generally been in line throughout the history of the industry, the potential change to the status 
quo gave rise to new divisions in interests. As the interests of these actors began to diverge, it was 
increasingly more difficult for the state to balance the interests of the different actors. That this 
was the case became more prominent as the debate continued, as will be demonstrated below.  
Additionally, given that this process was undertaken in the midst of the transition to democracy, 
further issues in developing the new regulatory regime were related to the relevant government 
actors and their respective interests and roles. That is, the Department of Minerals and Energy 
Affairs (DMEA) – whose interests were in the maintenance of the existing system30 – represented 
the apartheid government. However, the department was not able to present a policy position on 
behalf of government as the apartheid regime was removed mid-way through the process 
(Marquard, 2006: 319). The African National Congress (ANC), which replaced the apartheid 
government, was not directly represented in the process of determining the new regulatory 
framework. This was because political parties were excluded from the negotiation process 
(Crompton, 1998: 7). Additional complications were related to the fact that the ANC did not have 
a coherent policy position with regards to the liquid fuels industry. Indeed, the LFITF’s union 
delegates were unable to get the ANC to specify a formal policy position, noting that, ‘despite 
briefings and meetings with senior ANC leaders it proved impossible to raise the issue sufficiently 
high on the ANC’s agenda to extract a formal policy position…’ (Crompton, 1998: 9).  
                                                 
30 Crompton (1998: 10) notes that the DMEA had to honour the regulatory system, which they were responsible for 
administering. Their role in this process was further complicated by their responsibility for protecting the Central 
Energy Fund and Mossgas, the parastatals that the DMEA oversaw. According to Crompton, the inability of the 
DMEA to act in accordance with a clear mandate produced delays in the process and is ‘possibly the single most 
important reason for the demise of the LFITF’ (Crompton, 1998: 10).  
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Furthermore, the unions were ‘ideologically opposed to deregulation,’ with one union 
representative stating that, ‘…there is no possibility of deregulation in South Africa – only of who 
controls regulations’ (Crompton, 1998: 9). The Motor Industries Federation (subsequently, the 
Fuel Retailers Association) was also opposed to deregulation, in part due to the fact that the 
Ratplan guaranteed retail margins and protected them from the threat of vertical integration. 
Crompton (1998: 8) notes that the Black Fuel Retailers Association was also opposed to 
deregulation. This was because deregulation was perceived as a greater threat to their businesses 
than to white businesses. Accordingly, these actors had an interest in pursuing additional measures 
to protect and strengthen black business.  
Conversely, Marquard (2006: 319) notes that the business caucus was in favour of deregulation. 
Indeed, ‘…there was an antipathy from the broader business community towards Sasol and the oil 
companies who were believed to be benefiting unduly from the state’ (Crompton, 1998: 8). While 
business press targeted criticism at the regulatory system due to the belief that the liquid fuels 
industry had received extensive support from the state, the synthetic fuels producers were at the 
centre of this criticism.   
The other oil companies capitalised on this opportunity to separate themselves from the synthetic 
fuels industry and the negative perceptions associated with it. Subsequently, Engen managed to 
broker an agreement with industry for a process of phased deregulation. Marquard (2006: 320) 
notes that the objective of the OOCs in this regard was to undermine the dominant position enjoyed 
by Sasol as a result of the regulatory framework. Indeed, deregulation aligned the OOCs with the 
business caucus against Sasol and was a safer option as there were ‘more known parameters’ 
involved in deregulation (Marquard, 2006: 320). As previously mentioned, this division between 
the synthetic fuel producers and the other oil companies became more prominent as the debate 
over deregulation continued. 
In spite of these developments, the LFITF was unable to agree upon a common framework to 
reform the regulatory system.  According to Crompton (1998), this was largely informed by the 
disparity of interests and agendas pursued by the relevant actors. Historical institutional concepts 
have been useful in understanding the developments up until this point. Indeed, the impact of 
vested interests were prominent, as important actors in the decision making process had interests 
in maintaining the status quo. Alternatively, other important actors, such as the African National 
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Congress, were not well organised with regards to liquid fuels policy. These actors were therefore 
in less of a position to introduce change to the system. Additionally, where change did occur, these 
changes were minor elaborations of the preexisting institutions and advanced the industry further 
down the regulatory path. Consequently, historical institutional concepts demonstrate the way in 
which the endurance of industry regulation during this period points to institutional inertia. 
5.2.1. 1998 White Paper on the Energy Policy of South Africa 
The 1998 White Paper on the Energy Policy of South Africa marked a change in the state’s rhetoric 
on the question of deregulating the liquid fuels industry. Indeed, the liquid fuels section of the 
White Paper called for a process of ‘phased deregulation’ of the industry, which would be carried 
out in three phases. In the first phase of deregulation, the White Paper specified a number of 
milestones to be achieved, including approximately 25% ownership within the industry by 
historically disadvantaged South Africans (DMEA, 1998: 71). The second phase of deregulation 
included the removal of petroleum price regulation, import control, and the Ratplan. Finally, the 
third phase involved the state monitoring the industry and making any corrective actions necessary. 
However, the White Paper also noted that the synthetic fuels producers and OOCs should come to 
an agreement on the upliftment of the synthetic fuel producers’ products as long as these producers 
did not have access to marketing (DMEA, 1998: 71).  
This policy represented a critical juncture in that the structural and ideological influences on the 
institution of industry regulation were significantly relaxed with the state’s new emphasis on 
deregulation (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007: 343). Theoretically, this opened up the range of 
plausible decisions available to policy makers. However, a number of factors undermined the 
process of change, the first being that there is an issue built into the policy itself. Indeed, two of 
the concerns related to the debate over regulation versus deregulation appear to be in conflict with 
each other. As previously stated, one milestone to be achieved prior to deregulation is 25% BEE 
ownership. A second related concern is that deregulation will force smaller, less profitable players 
to be forced out of the market, causing industry rationalisation. Therefore, while the government’s 
stated policy was in favour of deregulation, the implication of these two stated concerns is that 




As noted in the previous chapter, the developments which followed the White Paper on the Energy 
Policy of the Republic of South Africa were more in line with a process of ‘re-regulation’ 
(Marquard, 2006: 324). While the Main Supply Agreement was subsequently removed, this was 
induced by Sasol, rather than the state. The Ratplan, rather than being completely removed, was 
replaced by a Department of Minerals and Energy-administered formal licensing process, in terms 
of the 2005 Petroleum Product Act. Therefore, while this institution underwent some change, it 
maintained regulatory barriers on entry to the liquid fuels industry. 
Similar to the aforementioned institutions, the institution of petroleum price regulation underwent 
some change in the early 2000s. However, much like those institutions, these changes fell short of 
outright deregulation. In 2002, the In Bond Landed Cost (IBLC) was replaced by the Basic Fuel 
Price (BFP). The formula used to arrive at the BFP was a result of an agreement between the 
Department of Minerals and Energy and the members of the South African Petroleum Industry 
Association (SAPIA) (Trade and Industry Chamber, 2011: 34). This thereby demonstrated the 
continued cooperation between the state and liquid fuels industry in the post-apartheid era. It may 
also be argued that the transition to the BFP demonstrates the way in which learning effects 
contribute to path dependency, as opposition to high fuel prices forced government address the 
issue of price regulation. However, rather than removing the institution entirely, government 
introduced innovations to the pricing system so as to reduce the price to be more effective – that  
is, more acceptable to the South African consumer. In doing so, this allowed the institution of price 
regulation to remain in place. 
The question is why import parity pricing continues despite the government’s stated policy in 
favour of deregulation. In the process of the 2006 Competition Tribunal on the proposed merger 
of Sasol and Engen31, the issue of petrol price regulation and the BFP were discussed. In his 
testimony to the Tribunal, Nhlanhla Gumede, then the Chief Director of the Hydrocarbons unit of 
the Department of Minerals and Energy, offers some insight into this issue. Firstly, Gumede noted 
that the White Paper states that as long as the petroleum price is regulated, the price would be 
                                                 
31 Interestingly, over the course of the trial it was revealed that the attempted merger was at least in part an attempt to 
gain more control over the market, thereby enabling Sasol to exercise more control over prices (Competition Tribunal, 
2006).  
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based on an import parity system (Engen Ltd, Sasol Ltd and Petronas International Corporation, 
2005: 1828).  
While this is not inherently an issue, the problem arises when the regulated price is not a true 
reflection of the import parity price, as was the case with the In Bond Landed Cost. This has also 
been raised as a possible issue with the BFP (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 18). For instance, in their 
testimony to the Competition Tribunal, BP repeatedly stated that the company believes that the 
BFP is not reflective of a true import parity price (Competition Tribunal, 2006: 26). Indeed, a BP 
representative indicated to the Competition Tribunal that ‘in a deregulated market the maximum 
[price] here wouldn’t be BFP. It would be a true import parity price, which in our estimation would 
be around 5c below BFP’ (Engen Ltd, Sasol Ltd and Petronas International Corporation, 2005: 
2957). The same view was also stated by Ernst Oberholster, the Managing Director of Sasol Oil at 
the time 32(Competition Tribunal, 2006: 26).  
Secondly, Gumede noted that the continuation of regulation and of import parity pricing was 
related to the ‘prevention of a bloodbath’ (Engen Ltd, Sasol Ltd and Petronas International 
Corporation, 2005: 1770). On this issue, Gumede noted that the retail sector had 30% more service 
stations than the market needs, and that deregulation may force those service stations to close. 
Presumably, Gumede was referring to those stations that would be unprofitable in the absence of 
regulated margins. Related to this, Gumede noted the impact that this would have on employment 
(Engen Ltd, Sasol Ltd and Petronas International Corporation, 2005:1770). What these claims 
demonstrate is the way in which institutions create sunk costs, undermining the prospect for their 
change. That is, any change to the institution by deregulating the price of petrol is viewed as a net 
cost, due to the overinvestment in the retail industry (which has been encouraged by the prevailing 
institution) and the prospect for unemployment.  
However, in order to gain an enhanced understanding of the political economy surrounding this 
issue, it is also important to note the interests and actions of other relevant actors. Over the course 
of the 2006 Competition Tribunal concerning the proposed merger of Sasol and Engen, evidence 
32 Mr. Oberholster states: ‘..where we import from, we import from mega or where the numbers come from, from mega 
refineries, huge cost efficient refineries, BFP relates to, if you do that on a consistent basis, large volumes, it’s a true 
import parity price. However in fully competitive, tough competing environment with people like Pick n Pay in the 
market, importing spot cargos all over the place, we do believe that there could be a lower import parity price, which 
will reflect in those markets and that would be, as I’ve said earlier, in the order of some 5c a litre below the current 
BFP price, which in fact is that 1.3% of the price today.’ 
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from multiple strategy documents revealed that a primary objective of Sasol is the maintenance of 
petrol price regulation. The Tribunal further revealed that the proposed merger was in part aimed 
at achieving this goal, noting that a presentation discussing the merger of Sasol/Engen lists, 
‘actively lobby the postponement of deregulation’ as an objective of the joint venture (2006: 55). 
Indeed, a second document from 2002 noted (Sasol, cited in Competition Tribunal, 2006: 51),  
The objective is to establish and control a profitable, sufficiently large and effective 
marketing infrastructure on a national basis and focused in the main metropolitan 
areas in order to protect and influence the wholesale fuel product price of the Sasol 
Group of Companies [emphasis added]. 
This aim was reiterated in another internal Sasol document which stated, ‘Primary objective: 
Creating leverage in wholesale fuel price to other oil companies by creating alternative distribution 
and value’ (Sasol, cited in Competition Tribunal, 2006: 52). As well as for a fourth time in a 
company presentation, ‘…to influence the market price of fuels and in this way to protect the 
wholesale price to the oil companies’. And finally, a fifth time in a draft minute of a Sasol Oil board 
meeting, ‘…to enable us to grow our business and protect and influence the wholesale fuel price of 
the Sasol Group if required’ (Sasol, cited in Competition Tribunal, 2006: 52). These excerpts serve 
a number of purposes. Firstly, they highlight the position of one of the major liquid fuels producers 
on the issue of petrol price deregulation and industry deregulation more broadly. Secondly, they 
highlight the actions undertaken by the company in an attempt to undermine the prospect for 
deregulation.  
Conversely, BP has presented a view in favour of industry deregulation. Indeed, BP has noted that 
the company believes that the major issue with the price formula arises out of the difference in costs 
of production incurred by the coastal and inland refiners and manufacturers (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 
69). Accordingly, Sasol was of the view that BP’s drive to terminate the BFP would expedite the 
process of deregulation (Competition Tribunal, 2006: 55).  
In investigating the failure of the state to deregulate the liquid fuels industry, it is also important to 
assess the extent to which the interests of the liquid fuels consumers are being represented. The 
ability of actors to influence policy outcomes depends on the extent to which they are able to 
organise (Baumgartner, 2009: 532). The Automobile Association of South Africa (AA), ‘acts as a 
powerful lobby group on behalf of motorists with government and parastatals to protect and 
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enhance motorists' interests’ (Automobile Association, n.d.). Accordingly, the AA has spoken out 
in favour of deregulation, noting the way in which the basis for determining the BFP is more than 
a decade old.  The AA also called into question the fact that Sasol has an entirely different cost 
structure to that of the OOCs and therefore benefits disproportionately at the expense of consumers 
(Automobile Association, n.d.). However, in a separate statement, a former spokesperson for the 
AA has been quoted as saying that petrol price deregulation would put too many jobs at risk. As a 
result, the spokesperson concluded that deregulation was not worth the reduction in prices paid by 
motorists (Steyn, 2013). Therefore, it is not unreasonable to question the extent to which the 
inability of the AA to present a coherent view in favour of price deregulation has inhibited its 
influence on the decision making process. 
While the transition to democracy and the 1998 White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic 
of South Africa created a critical juncture in the issue of liquid fuels industry regulation, the 
developments after these events demonstrate path-dependent processes. That is, due to the fact that 
deregulation was not pursued following these openings, the subsequent process of ‘re-regulation’ 
sent the industry further along that path thereby making it, ‘progressively more difficult to return 
to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available’ (Mahoney, 2000: 513). 
Therefore, applying the historical institutional approach to the case of industry regulation sheds 
light on the way in which the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels 
industry in South Africa has continued despite major political change. 
5.3. Termination of the Main Supply Agreement 
Contrary to the previous case, the termination of the Main Supply Agreement (MSA) represented 
a major institutional change in the liquid fuels industry. The Main Supply Agreement (MSA) was 
the upliftment agreement between Sasol and the OOCs which stipulated that the OOCs uplift 
production from Sasol in order to satisfy their inland marketing requirements (Competition 
Tribunal, 2006: 11). The MSA was terminated in 2003, following Sasol’s submission of its 
intention to terminate in 1998. The significance of this instance of institutional change relates to 
the fact that the MSA had been a core aspect of the liquid fuels regulatory framework since the 
establishment of Sasol. However, it is important to note that this institutional change was a result 
of Sasol’s own actions, rather than action taken on the part of the South African government. That 
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this was the case highlights the emphasis that the historical institutional approach places on the 
role of agency in achieving institutional change.  
While Sasol has claimed that its intentions in terminating the MSA were related to concerns over 
the anti-competitive nature of the agreement and the impending introduction of the new 
Competition Act in 1999, the Competition Tribunal has questioned Sasol’s motives. Indeed, the 
report by the Competition Tribunal (2006: 45) states, 
From the perspective of competition law there can be no gainsaying the nature of the 
MSA. It constituted a market sharing and output limiting cartel between Sasol and 
the OOCs …The essential nature of the MSA is common cause – indeed Sasol has 
consistently maintained, though not entirely convincing, that its reason for 
terminating the agreement was because it was advised that it would fall foul of the 
Competition Act. [Emphasis added].  
In highlighting ulterior motives on the part of Sasol in terminating the MSA, the Competition 
Tribunal noted that there were considerable changes taking place in the liquid fuels industry at the 
time. Accordingly, based on previous evidence, the Competition Tribunal (2006: 47) argued that 
Sasol’s intentions were to preempt these changes to the company’s advantage: 
The new South African government clearly intended to limit its role in the setting of 
fuel prices. It had already, to Sasol’s express dissatisfaction, changed the basis for 
calculating the regulated wholesale and retail prices from IBLC to BFP33. It had stated 
its clear intention to de-regulate the retail market, also a measure resisted by Sasol …  
Therefore, from this extract, as well as the extracts from Sasol documents discussed in the previous 
section, it seems evident that Sasol’s intentions in this regard were to postpone market 
deregulation34 by increasing its market power to put the company in a better position to actively 
lobby against deregulation. In addition, the Competition Tribunal argues that, due to diverging 
interests between the parties to the MSA, such a measure would have arraigned the OOCs in the 
                                                 
33 Recall from the previous section that despite this change the regulated price remained higher than a true import 
parity price (Competition Tribunal, 2006: 26). 
34 Oberholster, Managing Director of Sasol at the time, also testified, ‘Margins generally for the oil industry in a 
regulated environment tend to be higher than in a deregulated environment. So therefore if deregulation was to be 
postponed, it will be more profitable for Uhambo and for Sasol…’ (Competition Tribunal, 2006: 54-55).  
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inland retail market against Sasol. As a result, the Tribunal argued, the company had an interest in 
reconstituting the liquid fuels market.  
Furthermore, the Competition Tribunal notes that Sasol’s terminating the MSA coincided with a 
second important market development. Namely, logistical constraints in the pipeline network for 
white products between the coastal and inland markets granted Sasol considerable market power 
in the inland market (Competition Tribunal, 2006: 47). Accordingly, Sasol acted preemptively in 
terminating the MSA so as to prevent the OOCs from increasing their share of sales in the inland 
market. Therefore, while the interests of Sasol and the state in ensuring the success of the synthetic 
fuels industry protected the MSA for decades, the changing political economy during this period 
altered the interests of the synthetic fuels producer. In this new environment, from Sasol’s 
perspective, the current and future costs of the MSA outweighed the benefits35. Consequently, 
Sasol’s new interests were in ensuring its control over the liquid fuels market by any means 
necessary. Table 5 below indicates the sale of petrol through service stations by market share while 
Table 6 indicates sale of petrol to commercial and industrial customers by market share.  
 
Table 5: Sale of Petrol through Service Stations by Market Share (%) (circa 2005) 
Province BP Caltex TOTAL Shell Engen Sasol Total 
Eastern Cape 17 18 16 18 28 3 100 
Free State 11 21 8 24 24 12 100 
Gauteng 17 15 12 16 29 11 100 
KZN 19 19 12 23 26 1 100 
Limpopo 10 18 21 15 24 12 100 
Mpumalanga 9 14 24 13 28 12 100 
North West 11 17 12 16 29 14 100 
N Cape 13 36 6 20 21 4 100 
W Cape 19 21 11 20 27 1 100 
(Competition Tribunal, 2006: 70) 
Table 6: Sale of Petrol to Commercial and Industrial Customers by Market Share (%) (circa 2005) 
                                                 
35 It would be useful to know the true costs and benefits to Sasol as a result of the termination of the MSA so as to 
determine whether it was in fact beneficial to the company to terminate the MSA. However, no information in this 
regard was identified in the public domain and would necessitate information and data from Sasol to accurately 
estimate the net result. 
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Province BP Caltex Total Shell Engen Sasol Total 
Eastern Cape 12 5 37 18 20 8 100 
Free State 11 8 24 17 25 14 100 
Gauteng 20 3 25 7 24 21 100 
KZN 18 4 36 9 29 3 100 
Limpopo 6 5 45 12 19 12 100 
Mpumalanga 18 5 36 15 19 8 100 
North West 24 14 19 9 27 7 100 
N Cape 38 5 21 19 12 6 100 
W Cape 17 5 24 15 23 16 100 
(Competition Tribunal, 2006: 71) 
This instance of change was unique to the other instances covered in this chapter as the termination 
of the MSA represented a fundamental institutional change in the liquid fuels industry, not a mere 
instance of institutional inertia masquerading as institutional change. However, while the South 
African government established as policy its intention to deregulate the liquid fuels market, the 
removal of the MSA, which was a core aspect of the regulatory dispensation since Sasol’s 
establishment, was undertaken by Sasol. This instance of institutional change is also interesting as 
it demonstrates the ease with which an institution may be removed when it is in the interest of 
certain actors. This institutional change, while removing a primary regulatory benefit enjoyed by 
Sasol, resulted in further benefits to the synthetic fuels producer as it consolidated Sasol’s market 
power in the inland market. In line with historical institutional thinking, this case demonstrates the 
way in which institutional change may not solely be a result of an exogenous shock, but that agency 
also has an important role to play in producing institutional change.  
5.4. The Proposed Windfall Tax on Sasol 
The institution under investigation in this case is different from the other institutions mentioned in 
this chapter as it does not refer to a single regulatory element that can be traced throughout the 
history of the liquid fuels industry. Instead, this section is concerned with the broader institution 
of financial support extended to Sasol by the South African government. While this has existed in 
various forms throughout the history of the industry – previously, it was in the form of tariff 
protection – this case is concerned with the state’s decision not to impose a windfall tax on Sasol. 
Similar to previous measures of support, the decision to not impose a windfall tax is also related 
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to the price the company receives for its products36. In applying historical institutionalism to 
understand the National Treasury’s decision against imposing a windfall tax on the synthetic fuels 
producers, it is useful to consider the influence of the vested interests of relevant actors. Also 
important in this regard is the historically developed relationship between Sasol and the South 
African government. In doing so, this section argues that the failure to implement a windfall tax 
against Sasol provides further evidence of the way in which the liquid fuels subsidy regime and 
state support to the liquid fuels industry –and, the synthetic fuels industry in particular –have 
continued.  
In May 2006, then Minister of Finance Trevor A. Manuel announced that a task team would be 
appointed to investigate whether the synthetic fuels industry was generating windfall profits. 
Additionally, the team was tasked with determining whether a windfall tax should be implemented 
to ameliorate any excessive profits. The decision in this regard was informed by changes in the 
international market for crude oil as it was believed that there had been a possible structural 
increase in the price of Brent crude oil37.   
The Task Team’s report began by reviewing the development of the liquid fuels industry in South 
Africa, particularly noting the regulatory and financial incentives extended by the state to the 
synthetic fuels producers (Rustomjee et al, 2007). With regards to the potential generation of 
excessive profits on the part of these producers, the Task Team made a number of important 
findings. The first finding was that during times of high oil prices, there is a structural propensity 
for the synthetic fuels producers to generate excessive economic profits. The report notes that this 
was a result of the differing cost structures between the synthetic fuels producers and the OOCs. 
Also important in this regard was the basis on which the price of petroleum was determined 
(Rustomjee et al, 2007: 13). As a consequence of these concerns, the Task Team concluded that a 
windfall tax should be imposed on the existing synthetic fuels producers. Additionally, the Task 
Team recommended additional reforms to the regulatory regime, including an overhaul of the 
36 The connection between tariff protection and the issue of the windfall profits generated by Sasol relates to the fact 
that, when the tariff protection system was in use, there was an element that stipulated that above a certain price, Sasol 
would pay money back in to the Equalisation Fund. In addressing the issue of windfall profits, the idea is that the 
company had generated too much profit during times of high oil prices and should have to pay some share of that 
profit back, similar to the tariff protection mechanism.  
37 Between 2003 and the third quarter of 2005, the price of crude oil had increased from an average price of 
US$29/barrel to a high of US$60/barrel (National Treasury, 2007: 1).  
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import parity price. More specifically, the report noted that the formula according to which the 
BFP was determined should be reassessed so as to be more reflective of a ‘true import parity’ price 
as it was believed to be too high (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 18).  
Furthermore, the Task Team raised the concern that regulatory reforms could not adequately 
address the excessive profits generated as a result of certain revenue and cost elements in the value 
chain. One key concern in this regard was the propensity for inland producers, primarily Sasol and 
Natref, to generate windfall profits as a result of logistical constraints related to inadequate 
transport infrastructure38. Consequently, the Task Team recommended that a tax should be 
imposed on the volume of petrol that OOCs were obliged to purchase from Sasol due to logistical 
constraints on transporting fuel to the inland market, called the ‘must have volumes’ (Rustomjee 
et al, 2007: 19). Finally, the Task Team recommended an investigation into whether Sasol was 
required to repay the subsidies received by the company during the Pim Goldby subsidy regime. 
In the National Treasury’s response to the Task Team’s findings, the Treasury noted three strategic 
interests and concerns that were taken into account when considering the recommendations put 
forward by the Task Team. These included, firstly, the negative impact on investment caused by a 
new tax. That is, the response notes that maintaining regulatory and fiscal certainty for the energy 
companies operating in South Africa is important and that any changes to this environment may 
discourage investment. Secondly, the response raised concerns relating to constraints on the supply 
of electricity and liquid fuels faced by the country at the time39. Finally, Treasury also noted 
concerns over adherence to higher environmental standards40 (National Treasury, 2007: 3).  
In the conclusion to the response, Treasury stated that it agreed with the Task Team that excessive 
profits had been generated in South Africa’s synthetic fuel industry. However, Treasury noted that 
it was unable to be determined whether these windfalls had been generated as a result of a 
permanent change in the international price of Brent crude oil. Accordingly, the report concluded 
that it would not be appropriate to impose a windfall tax on the synthetic fuel producers – primarily 
Sasol. Importantly, Treasury highlighted that it is a matter of national interest that synthetic fuels 
                                                 
38 Recall from the previous section that logistical constraints granted Sasol considerable market power in the inland 
market.  
39 This concern appears to relate to the need to avoid exacerbating these constraints by imposing a tax. 
40 This appears to refer to the need to avoid imposing additional costs that would detract from investments in 
technology to pursue higher environmental standards.  
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producers, namely Sasol, continue to invest in synthetic fuel technology. Further, National 
Treasury emphasised that, in the interest of energy security, any public interventions should ‘focus 
on facilitating the expansion of liquid fuel supply capacity’ (National Treasury, 2007: 4).  
Recall from the previous chapter that these interests are similar to those put forward by Treasury 
to excuse Sasol from the company’s obligation to repay subsidies received during the Pim Goldby 
era. That is, Sasol was released from this obligation ‘provided it continued to develop the 
petrochemicals sector’ [emphasis added] (National Treasury, 2007: 3). Indeed, this interest is 
clearly reiterated in National Treasury’s response opposing the imposition of a windfall tax, 
stating, ‘…we hold Sasol to its commitment to significantly expand its synthetic fuel production 
capacity in support of the national interest in terms of fuel security and macroeconomic stability’ 
(National Treasury, 2007: 4). However, while Treasury highlights Sasol’s proposal to build a new 
coal to liquid (CTL) plant (Project Mafutha) as evidence of the company’s efforts in expanding 
the synthetic fuels industry, it is important to note that this project was suspended in 2010 and has 
not had any progress since (Njobeni, 2012). That this is the case is interesting as it is similar to the 
case of the South African government continuing to offer tariff protection to Sasol in 1996, 
provided the company created 50,000 sustainable jobs.  Recall that the company similarly failed 
to meet this obligation. These persistent narratives around Sasol as key to investment in the 
industry and employment, which continue despite Sasol’s failure to meet stipulated agreements, 
provide evidence of the way in which discourse may contribute to institutional path dependency. 
Treasury also responded to the Task Team’s recommendation that a tax be imposed on Sasol’s 
‘must have volumes’ of liquid fuels supplied to the inland market. Treasury stated that government 
had decided not to consider a tax on these volumes, but would explore a tax on refined products in 
order to provide financing for the new Multi-Product Pipeline (National Treasury, 2007: 5). No 
evidence was found to indicate whether or not this happened. Additionally, as mentioned 
previously, Treasury noted that Sasol was released from its obligation to repay the subsidies 
generated during the Pim Goldby subsidy regime. Finally, the National Treasury’s response failed 
to acknowledge the Task Team’s recommendation that the BFP be reformed (National Treasury, 
2007).  
What is interesting about this case is that there appears to be two parallel formal orders at play. In 
the first, the National Treasury ordered the establishment of a task team to investigate potential 
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windfall profits in the synthetic fuels industry, thereby paying lip service to an issue under scrutiny 
at the time. In the second order, however, the National Treasury decided not to impose a tax, 
despite the finding that excessive profits had been generated and that there were further issues in 
the regulatory regime. The implication of this outcome is that, while seemingly giving the issue its 
due regard, the National Treasury ultimately maintained the status quo by choosing to financially 
support Sasol by not imposing any taxes on the company. This case is also interesting as it provides 
further insight into the nature of the relationship between the state and Sasol and the way in which 
Sasol’s interests appear to be prioritised by the state. Drawing on historical institutional concepts, 
this discussion of the National Treasury’s decision against imposing a windfall tax on Sasol 
demonstrates the way in which the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels 
industry has continued following the transition to democracy. 
5.5. Transition from the OP26 to the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 
Prior to 2006, the OP26 was the tax regime applicable to oil and gas companies undertaking 
exploration and upstream production in South Africa. While the expiration of the OP26 and 
subsequent transition to the Income Tax Act in 2006 represented a major change to an institution 
which had been in place for four decades, further analysis of the contents of the two regimes reveals 
more institutional inertia than is readily apparent. Indeed, although the Tenth Schedule to the 
Income Tax Act is more transparent than the OP26, this tax regime retains the core elements of its 
predecessor. Similar to the aforementioned cases, the historical institutional approach assists in 
understanding this instance of institutional inertia as it sheds light on the endurance of the liquid 
fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry following the transition to 
democracy. 
The introduction of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act in 2006 was informed by a number 
of considerations. Firstly, as the OP26 was due to expire in 2007, the South African Revenue 
Services (SARS) needed to design a new tax regime. This was particularly important as it was 
aware that the oil and gas companies were postponing further investment due to the uncertainty 
caused by the end of the OP26 and content of the new fiscal provisions (National Treasury, 2006: 
16). The second influential factor was the democratic state’s desire to introduce more transparency 
to the industry, which had previously been veiled in secrecy. However, rather than creating a new 
tax regime entirely, the Explanatory Memorandum notes that the aim of introducing the Tenth 
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Schedule was to ‘formalise key aspects of the OP26 into explicit law’ (National Treasury, 2006: 
16). The reason for this is largely due to vested interests as the Explanatory Memorandum notes 
that, ‘few active companies in the area would remain interested if the key features of the OP26 
regime are not renewed’ (National Treasury, 2006:  16).  
This demonstrates the way in which adaptive expectations lead to path dependency, as the content 
of Tenth Schedule was informed by the state’s expectations about the actions of the active oil and 
gas companies in the country. In this regard, the decision to maintain the favourable provisions of 
the OP26 reflects institutional sunk costs. This is because the comments reflect that there was a 
perception among National Treasury that the cost of removing the provisions in pursuit of another 
policy path was too high as some active companies may disinvest in the absence of these 
provisions.  
Accordingly, the Tenth Schedule retained the OP26 provisions related to the full deduction of 
operating and capital expenses. The new tax regime also retained the aspect which specified that 
custom duties are not applied to imported equipment and machinery for mining operations (Futter, 
2010: 94). However, while retaining many of the core aspects of the OP26, it has been argued that 
some aspects of the Tenth Schedule are in fact more favourable than the previous tax regime41. For 
instance, while capital expenditure enjoys a full deduction under both regimes, capital expenditure 
under the Tenth Schedule benefits from additional tax deductions. Indeed, expenditure related to 
exploration enjoy a 200% deduction, while capital expenditure related to production activities 
enjoys a 150% super deduction42. Additionally, Futter (2010: 22) notes that 28% cap on the 
corporate income tax rate under the Tenth Schedule is more favourable than that provided for 
under the OP26 regime. That this is the case is significant as the new tax regime both retained and 
expanded the tax subsidies enjoyed by the liquid fuel producers, thereby maintaining and 
reinforcing the liquid fuels subsidy regime.  
On the face of it, the termination of the OP26 appeared to represent a considerable institutional 
change as this was the tax regime that had been in place over many decades. Its termination was 
also significant due to the fact that it also changed the system of secrecy built into the liquid fuels 
                                                 
41 Alternatively, some of the aspects are also less favourable. 
42 The implication of these provisions is that the deduction of losses and expenditures are limited to the year in which 
they are incurred (Futter, 2010: 70).  
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industry as more transparency was introduced by the new Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
However, further investigation of the content of the two regimes reveals that the most favourable 
aspects of the OP26 were retained in the new tax regime and that additional favourable provisions 
were also added. While it is important to acknowledge that the initial incentives existed due to the 
‘high-risk, high-cost’ nature of the industry, what is important here is the expectations created by 
the incentives. That this is the case points to the endurance of institutions as incentives create state-
industry dynamics which are not easily removed. It also provides support to the historical 
institutionalist argument that any institutional revisions which occur are often channeled and 
constrained by previous institutional choices and arrangements (Pierson, 2004: 288). Accordingly, 
despite the creation of the Tenth Schedule Income Tax Act in 2006, the content of the new regime 
points more towards vested interests and perceptions of sunk costs contributing to institutional 
inertia, as the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry continued.  
5.6. Conclusion 
A number of changes took place in the liquid fuels industry following the transition to democracy. 
However, these changes were largely incremental in nature and retained the core foundation of the 
former institutions. That this is the case is interesting not only because the transition from apartheid 
created an opening for major political change throughout the state, but also because the 
government’s stated policy and rhetoric often pointed towards more fundamental change. Instead, 
the cases of the endurance of industry regulation, the decision not to impose a windfall tax on the 
synthetic fuels producers and the transition to the Tenth Schedule point to institutional inertia. The 
only large institutional change within the liquid fuels industry was the termination of the Main 
Supply Agreement (MSA), which was induced by Sasol, rather than the South African state. One 
important finding that emerged from some of these instances was the way in which Sasol’s 
interests appear to trump the interests of other industry actors. The historical institutional approach 
assists in understanding and explaining these instances of institutional inertia and change for the 
way in which is applies the concepts of sunk costs, path dependency, critical junctures as well as 
the influence of vested interests. In doing so, the approach sheds light on the reasons for which the 
liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry has continued despite 
major political change.  
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VI. Subsidies to the Liquid Fuels Industry: Who Benefits and How?
In order to adequately address the endurance of the liquid fuels subsidy regime in the post-
apartheid era, it is necessary to identify the actors who continue to enjoy subsidies as well as the 
various ways in which liquid fuels production is subsidised. The previous chapters largely focused 
on the content of policies and regulations providing subsidies and other measures of support to 
liquid fuels producers, and aimed to understand and explain the factors that have contributed to 
the endurance of these support measures. Conversely, this chapter aims to quantify the various 
measures of support that are witnessed in the present in order to provide evidence of the endurance 
of the liquid fuels subsidy regime. Given South Africa’s history of petrol price regulation, an 
appropriate definition of subsidy should be able to capture direct subsidies as well as the more 
indirect subsidies, particularly those related to market price support. In line with this definition, 
direct transfers are the first subsidy category under consideration. Many of the beneficiaries of 
these subsidies are state owned companies receiving direct payments from the state or from other 
entities acting on behalf of the state. Tax expenditures resulting in subsidies to liquid fuels 
producers as a result of government revenue foregone are also discussed. Finally, market price 
transfers from consumers to producers, primarily Sasol, are considered. Highlighting these 
subsidies to liquid fuels producers and applying the historical institutional approach to understand 
these subsidies, this chapter argues that the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the 
liquid fuels industry have continued despite major political change. 
6.1. Subsidy Definition 
Before delving into the types of subsidies observed in South Africa’s liquid fuels industry, it is 
useful to briefly review the definition of a subsidy that was first provided in Chapter Two. As 
noted in Chapter Two, countries adopt a number of different approaches to subsidising the fossil 
fuels industry. Accordingly, it is important to define subsidies to the liquid fuels industry in a way 
that adequately captures the varied ways in which the synthetic fuels producers and OOCs have 
received financial support from both the South African government and consumers. Consequently, 
this study begins by adopting the definition of subsidy set out by the WTO’s Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), with an additional subsidy type as specified by 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. This approach has support in the 
international literature on subsidies as it has previously been adopted by other organisations 
studying subsidies, such as the Global Subsidies Initiative. Furthermore, this approach is sensitive 
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to the historical ways in which South Africa has subsidised liquid fuels producers and is able to 
capture the ways in which these types of support continue. 
The WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) provides the 
foundation for defining a subsidy. It is the most widely accepted definition of a subsidy, having 
been agreed to by the WTO’s member states. According to the Agreement, subsidisation confers 
a benefit to some entity and involves ‘a financial contribution by a government or any public body 
within the territory of a Member…or price support43 in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994’ 
(WTO, 1994: 229). The types of subsidies captured by this definition which are witnessed in the 
South African liquid fuels industry can be found in Table 7 below.  
However, as the ASCM does not include market price support (MPS), the present study expands 
the definition of a subsidy to include this measure44. MPS creates transfers between consumers 
and producers as a result of fuel price regulation. The inclusion of this measure was deemed to be 
necessary as the regulation of petroleum prices in South Africa has historically benefited the 
synthetic fuel producers and OOCs at the expense of motorists. 
Such an approach to defining subsidies has support in the subsidies literature, and has been used 
by international organisations concerned with measuring subsidies to various industry, such as the 
Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) (GSI, 2010b). Therefore, Table 7Table 7 below captures 
subsidies types which fall under the ASCM definition (columns one and two from the left), as well 
as the OECD’s market price support (column three from the left).  
This definition therefore offers a complete view of the ways in which liquid fuel production has 
been, and continues to be, subsidised by the South African state and liquid fuels consumers. The 
definition set out in the ASCM captures direct transfers as well as the more implicit or indirect 
subsidies arising out of tax expenditures. The addition of the OECD’s measure of market price 
support is also able to account for the more indirect ways in which liquid fuels consumers subsidise 
liquid fuels producers as a result of the regulated price of petroleum. In doing so, this approach 
demonstrates the way in which the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels 
industry have continued to present. 
                                                 
43 This refers to any price support that decreases the number of imports into a member territory or increases the number 
of exports (World Trade Organisation, 2016).  
44 This is similar to the International Energy Agency’s definition of subsidy, as measured by the price-gap approach.  
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Table 7: An Illustrative List of Subsidies to Liquid Fuels Production in South Africa 
Direct transfer or potential direct 
transfer of funds 
Government revenue foregone Income or price support, or relief 
from normal costs or procedures 
Direct payments Tax expenditure: reduced tax rates, 
exemptions, rebates 
Above-market rate prices for producers 
via government regulations or import 
barriers  
Grants Accelerated depreciation allowances  
Guarantees for loans, security or 
credit 
  
Government spending on research 
and development 
  
Loans provided at rates or under 
conditions below those that would 
prevail in a normal market 
  
(Adopted from Global Subsidies Initiative, 2010b: 4-5) 
6.2. Direct Transfers 
The first approach to subsidising liquid fuel production is by use of direct transfers, which refers 
to direct budgetary outlays for the purpose of fossil fuel energy production (Koplow, 2015: 4). As 
these figures are accounted for in the national budget, these are the most ‘visible’ form of policy 
transfers (OECD Secretariat, 2015: 27). In accounting for direct transfers, both the WTO and the 
OECD note the importance of measuring direct transfers from the government fiscus, as well as 
transfers originating from other public entities. Through identifying these subsidies, this section 
argues that the use of direct transfers to liquid fuel production has maintained the liquid fuels 
subsidies regime and been a key aspect of state support to the liquid fuels industry. 
PetroSA, South Africa’s state-owned oil and gas company, has benefited from government 
subsidies in the form of government grants for personnel training on projects (PetroSA, 2013: 
123). While the particular projects benefiting from grants are unspecified, it is assumed that these 
financial benefits accrue to fossil fuel production given the fact that PetroSA’s core business 
activities are related to the exploration, production and marketing of oil and gas products (PetroSA, 
2013: 7). Support in this regard spanned five years, with total subsidies to PetroSA amounting to 
R20.2 million between 2009 and 2013 (2012 rands) (PetroSA, 2010: 134; PetroSA, 2012: 121; 
PetroSA, 2013: 123). 
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This financial support from the South African government to PetroSA should be understood based 
on a number of key considerations. Firstly, from a historical institutional perspective it is important 
to consider the history of state subsidisation first enjoyed by Soekor and Mossgas, from which the 
company was formed. Accordingly, the state’s practice of extending financial and other benefits 
to PetroSA is an extension of the institution of subsidisation first enjoyed by the company’s 
predecessors. Also important in this regard is the relationship established between the state and 
PetroSA as the company continues to be a state-owned enterprise. Finally, support to PetroSA 
should also be considered in the context of the state’s emphasis on the synthetic fuels industry 
more broadly, which has historically benefited from extensive support from the South African 
government, as evidenced in Chapters Four and Five.  
When accounting for direct transfers, it is important to measure all financing offered through 
public institutions. This fact is particularly important in the context of South Africa, where a 
number of agencies are responsible for overseeing energy and environment-related activities. For 
example, the Central Energy Fund (CEF) used R418.7 million in expenditure between 2010/2011 
and 2014/2015 for the promotion of natural gas and oil exploration and production (2012 rands) 
(National Treasury, 2014: 688; National Treasury, 2015: 476). A further R117 million in 
expenditure was estimated for the 2015/2016 financial year (National Treasury, 2016a: 476). 
Additionally, in 2013, CEF allocated R217 million to the South African National Energy 
Development Institute (SANEDI) to be used over the medium-term. However, it appears that only 
R164.4 million of this amount was used, with R67 million appropriated in 2013/2014 and R97.4 
million in 2014/2015. These financial transfers were for the purposes of funding SANEDI’s 
operations, as well as for undertaking research and development concerned with hydraulic 
fracturing and carbon capture projects (National Treasury, 2015: 474). 
The fact that CEF is both a beneficiary and a distributor of subsidies should be considered in the 
context of the institution’s history. The State Oil Fund, which was later renamed CEF, was 
established to assist with the capital costs associated with the construction of Sasol 2 and 3 and 
provided low interest rate loans to the company in this regard (Marquard, 2006: 269, 298). 
Accordingly, CEF has historically been a key aspect of the liquid fuels subsidy regime and an 
institution through which the South African state has extended support to the liquid fuels regime. 
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Subsidies to fossil fuel production in South Africa can also be identified in the transport step of 
the value chain. The Hydrocarbon Policy subprogramme is concerned with ensuring secure supply 
of energy and enhancing access to hydrocarbon resources. Under this subprogramme, a total of R4 
843 million in subsidies were transferred to Transnet between financial years 2010/2011 and 
2012/2013 (2012 rands). The financing was collected through an additional levy on the fuel price 
and the transfers were used to support the commissioning of the new multi-products pipeline45. 
The aim of this pipeline was to minimise constraints faced in supplying liquid fuels from Durban 
to the inland markets of Gauteng, and resulted in average annual transfers of R1 614 million over 
the three year period (National Treasury, 2014: 673). The aforementioned subsidies have been 
captured in Table 8 below.  
Table 8: Direct Transfers to the Liquid Fuels Industry in South Africa 
 
A number of actors can be seen to have benefited from direct transfers from the South African 
government. The primary beneficiaries of these types of subsidies include PetroSA, the Central 
Energy Fund, SANEDI and Transnet. These transfers should not be considered as once off 
occurrences, however. Instead, they should be understood in the context of a longer history of state 
support to the production of liquid fuels. Such an approach provides for an understanding of the 
                                                 
45 The construction of this pipeline was informed by a need to add transport capacity to the constrained logistics 
network. This was in part informed by the fact that Petronet, which preceded Transnet, reached an agreement with 
Sasol to convert the crude oil and Durban-Witwatersrand pipelines to transport methane rich gas in 1995. The 
implication of this decision was that only Sasol’s products could be transported in the newly converted pipeline, 
thereby producing the logistical constraints referred to in the previous chapter (Competition Tribunal, 2006: 142).  




























5.37 3.79 3.71 3.09 4.24 - - 20.20 
CEF Government 
Funding 
- 97.92 64.84 75.50 78.87 101.54 116.98 535.65 
SANEDI Government 
funding 





- 1,614.33 1,614.33 1,614.33 - - - 4,843.00 
Total  5.37 1,716.04 1682.88 1,692.92 150.09 198.95 116.98 5,563.23 
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maintenance of the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry in the 
post-apartheid era. 
6.3. Government Revenue Foregone 
Fossil fuel producers can also be subsidised by use of tax expenditures, which are deviations from 
a benchmark tax that reduce the amount of revenue collected from producers. Notably, the GSI 
has found that producer subsidies are most often in the form of government revenue foregone (GSI, 
2010a). However, these are more indirect forms of subsidies and are not as easily measured. In the 
context of South Africa, these subsidies occur as a result of the provisions of the Tenth Schedule, 
which allows for super deductions on oil and gas exploration and production activities. 
Government revenue is also foregone as a result of the super deduction allowances on research 
and development activities. It is important to note that the institutions themselves are not subsidies, 
but rather they confer subsidies for those producers that access them so as to reduce tax liability. 
Similar to the previous sections, this section argues that these subsidies provide yet further 
evidence of the maintenance of the liquid fuels subsidy regime following the transition to 
democracy. 
Similar to direct budgetary spending, tax expenditure measures effectively reduce the cost of 
producing fossil fuels below that which would prevail under a standard tax treatment. However, 
unlike budgetary spending, tax expenditures are seldom determined within the budgetary 
framework and do not require legislative approval annually. As a result, tax expenditures are not 
often subject to the same scrutiny and spending discipline experienced by budgetary transfers 
(Kojima & Koplow, 2015: 27).  
In calculating the value of subsidies resulting from tax expenditures, it is important to establish a 
counterfactual against which to measure the value of the subsidy. According to the international 
subsidies literature, the ex post assessment, which estimates government revenue foregone, is the 
most common approach used to estimate subsidies from tax expenditures (Kojima and Koplow, 
2005: 27). On this, Bruce (1990: 13) explains, “the value of a tax expenditure is calculated as the 
value foregone as a result of a special tax preference using the existing tax rate structure”. That is, 
it is the difference between the tax paid under the preferential provision and the tax that would 
have been paid under a standard tax treatment, taking into account each producer accessing the 
preferential tax provisions.  
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While estimates of the value of these subsidies were not able to be undertaken due to lack of data, 
it is important to identify the tax expenditures in South Africa that result in subsidies to liquid fuels 
producers. In the liquid fuels sector, expenditure related to research and development benefits from 
a tax deduction in the amount of 150% of the research and development-related investment. 
Additionally, the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act specifies that capital expenditure related 
to liquid fuels exploration activities also enjoys tax deductions, equal to 200% of the exploration-
related investment. Alternatively, capital expenditure related to post-exploration activities, such as 
in processing and separation, attracts a tax deduction equal to 150% of the investment (Ernst and 
Young, 2015: 549). Garg and Kitson (2015: 3) also noted these tax expenditures as conferring 
subsidies to oil and gas producers, and estimated the value of government revenue foregone as a 
result of the 200% super deduction on exploration activities to be up to R3.0 billion in 2013. These 
deductions are indicated in Table 9 below.  
Table 9: Government Revenue Foregone 
 
 
Tax expenditures in South Africa result in subsidies to liquid fuels producers as a result of 
government revenue foregone. As these foregone revenues are not reflected in the fiscus and the 
data necessary to calculate their value are not published, the value of these subsidies is not easily 
measured. Furthermore, as the deductions related to exploration and production activities are built 
into the Tenth Schedule, the tax regime which succeeded the OP 26, these favourable tax 
treatments provide evidence of institutional inertia in the tax regime applicable to the liquid fuels 
sector. That this is the case reflects the maintenance of the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state 
support to the liquid fuels industry despite the radical political change represented by the end of 
apartheid. 
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6.4. Market Price Transfers 
The final approach to subsidising the production of liquid fuels is as a result of market price 
transfers. Market price transfers arise due to policy interventions, such as price regulation, and 
create transfers between consumers and producers (OECD Secretariat, 2010: 19). In the context of 
South Africa, such transfers occur as a result of the regulated price of petroleum. Indeed, the 
previous two chapters have discussed the ways in which the two pricing structures which have 
been used to determine the petrol price in South Africa are higher than true import parity prices 
(Competition Tribunal, 2006: 26). Accordingly, capturing this type of support is important as it 
provides evidence of the endurance of the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the 
liquid fuels producers. 
While the supracompetitive value of the BFP, which as previously noted is above a true IPP 
(Rustomjee et al, 2007: 97), results in price transfers to all of the liquid fuels producers in South 
Africa, this section argues that Sasol has benefited disproportionately as a result of the regulated 
price. This is particularly important in the context of the long history of price support received by 
Sasol, including the tariff protection referred to in the previous chapters. 
 The first reason for arguing that Sasol benefits from the IPP disproportionately is related to the 
fact that Sasol accepts an import parity price despite the fact that its inputs and products are 
domestically produced46, and therefore not linked to fluctuations in the international price of crude 
oil. That this is the case provides evidence of the difficulty of removing entrenched institutions, 
particularly when actors have an interest in maintaining these institutions, as the previous chapter 
demonstrated Sasol’s actions aimed at maintaining price regulation. 
The second reason for arguing that Sasol benefits from the regulated price disproportionately 
relates to the reduction in its cost base relative to the price of oil. When Sasol was first established, 
it was determined that the company would accept an import parity price so as to ensure its financial 
success (Sparks, 2016: 1; Cronin, 2013). However, Sasol continues to accept this price, despite the 
fact that the company’s costs have since decreased considerably. Recall that this concern was 
referred to in the previous chapter as BP pointed out that the primary issue with the BFP relates to 
the difference in cost structures between inland and coastal refiners (Rustomjee et al, 2007: 69). 
                                                 




Related to this, the Competition Tribunal has also described the ‘highly competitive oil-from-coal 
feedstock’ and how this has assisted in bringing down Sasol’s costs relative to the OOCs and to 
the price of oil (Competition Tribunal, 2006: 43).  
While the exact cost per barrel is treated as proprietary knowledge, it is estimated that Sasol’s 
current cost of producing a barrel of oil from coal is approximately $40 (Cronin, 2013). This cost 
base should be considered in the context of the price of oil today. The cost of oil per barrel has 
increased to over $100 per barrel in the past decade, although it is currently priced at approximately 
$47 per barrel (Bloomberg, 2016). This brief discussion aims to highlight that there is a propensity 
for Sasol to generate excessive economic profits during times of high oil prices due to the fact that 
the company accepts an import parity price. 
Consequently, it is important to attempt to measure the value of the subsidy Sasol receives as a 
result of market price transfers47. Market price transfers are found by multiplying the value of the 
market price differential, or the difference between the domestic and border prices, by the amount 
of production. This is indicated in the formula below.  
Market price transfers = (domestic price – border price) x production volume 
In the context of South Africa, the domestic price is the BFP, which has been calculated as an 
average price for 2012, not including levies collected by government. Regulated margins have also 
been removed from the BFP price, as the point is not to argue that producers should not receive a 
return at all, but that there is a point beyond which the level of returns is not appropriate (which in 
this case arises due to price regulation). These values were taken from the Department of Energy’s 
petrol price archive (DOE, 2016). For the border price, the OECD notes that, for a net importer, 
the border price is the value of cost (FOB) plus insurance plus freight (CIF) (OECD Secretariat, 
2010: 24). This data was also obtained from a Department of Energy source ((Mkhize & Maake, 
2012). 
Accordingly, the value of the subsidy to Sasol resulting from market price transfers was estimated 
at approximately R1.5 billion, as indicated in Table 10 below. The detailed data are given in 
Appendix Two.  
                                                 
47 The only year for which this value was estimated was 2012 due to data availability. 
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Table 10: Sasol Market Price Transfers 
Subsidy Type of Subsidy 2012 estimate (Rb) Total estimate (Rb) 
Sasol Market price transfer 1.5 1.5 
 
Reform of the regulated price of liquid fuels is not currently a priority on the policy agenda 
(Burton, Lott and Rennkamp, in press), which is in part informed by the persistent narrative that 
Sasol is key to South Africa’s energy security, thereby indicating discursive path dependency 
(Engen Ltd, Sasol Ltd and Petronas International Corporation, 2005: 1767). It is also informed by 
the fact that Sasol is viewed as strategically important to South Africa’s economy with regards to 
security of liquid fuels supply, investment in the industry, tax, local job creation and value added 
in terms of domestic beneficiation of coal into higher value products (Burton, Lott and Rennkamp, 
in press; Rustomjee et al, 2007). Furthermore, deregulation has been delayed as there is a 
perception that reform would threaten new BEE entrants across the liquid fuels value chain (Engen 
Ltd, Sasol Ltd and Petronas International Corporation, 2005: 1777). 
Market price transfers are the final subsidies to liquid fuel production identified in South Africa. 
These subsidies arise as a result of the regulated price of petroleum in South Africa, which 
produces transfers from consumers to producers. Sasol is perceived to be the primary beneficiary 
of this subsidy due to its reduced cost base compared to the other oil companies in South Africa. 
An additional, related reason for focusing on Sasol is due to the fact that the company produces its 
output domestically, yet accepts an import parity price. An estimate was only undertaken for 2012 
due to data constraints for other years. This estimate of market price transfers to Sasol came to 
approximately R1.5 billion in 2012. This subsidy is significant not only due to its magnitude, but 
also due to its endurance as this regulated price has been extended to Sasol since 1954. That this 
is the case provides evidence of the endurance of South Africa’s liquid fuels subsidy regime and 
state support to the liquid fuels producers despite the country’s transition to democracy. 
6.5. Conclusion 
South Africa’s liquid fuels industry therefore benefits from a number of direct and indirect 
subsidies. Using the ASCM definition of subsidy as the foundation while also accounting for what 
the OECD identifies as market price support is practically useful as it allows for a better 
understanding of the many ways in which the production of liquid fuels is subsidised. These 
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subsidies can be broadly separated into three categories: those arising as a result of direct transfers, 
government revenue foregone and market price transfers. While some of the subsidies are directed 
towards specific actors, other subsidies benefit producers more broadly. Historical institutionalism 
is useful in understanding these subsidies as many of these financial support measures have their 
origins in a broader history of state support, either to the specific actors or to the collection of 
actors. Consequently, the liquid fuels production subsidies identified between 2009 and 2015 
demonstrate the endurance of South Africa’s liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to their 
liquid fuel industry, despite the major political change represented by the transition to democracy.  
VII. Findings and Discussion 
The research question underpinning the study concerned the factors contributing to the 
maintenance of South Africa’s liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuel 
industry despite the major political change represented by the transition to democracy. Chapter 
Three of the study reviewed the development of the liquid fuels industry and highlighted the 
financial and regulatory methods of support to South Africa’s liquid fuels producers. Applying the 
historical institutional theoretical approach, Chapters Three and Four highlighted the ways in 
which these measures of support became entrenched over time. Particularly important in this 
regard were the effects of institutional lock in, path dependency, perceptions of sunk costs and 
vested interests which were driving forces maintaining these institutions. Finally, Chapter Five 
revealed the direct and indirect subsidies to liquid fuels production in the present. As discussed in 
the introduction, these subsidies and the institutional arrangements underpinning them should be 
considered in the context of the G20’s commitment to phase out harmful fossil fuel subsidies. 
However, many governments are unaware of the extent of fossil fuel subsidies in their countries 
(Whitley, 2013: 7). Through responding to the research question, this study has ultimately shed 
light on the ways in which liquid fuels are subsidised in South Africa as well as the institutional 
barriers undermining the prospect for subsidy reform. 
In order to adequately address the research question, the first section of the analysis began by 
understanding the development of South Africa’s liquid fuels industry. Through analysing the 
development of actors as well as policies and regulations, this section found that the industry 
developed with considerable support from the South African state. Notably, the section found that 
the synthetic fuels producers were the primary beneficiaries of state support, although the liquid 
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fuels industry more broadly also benefited in a number of ways. This support was extended through 
two key approaches: financial support and regulatory or policy-oriented support.  
Financial support to the liquid fuels producers generally and the synthetic fuels producers 
specifically existed in various forms. Looking at financial support to liquid fuels producers 
generally, this section noted the ways in which the regulated price of petroleum was higher than a 
true import parity price. This was the case for the In Bond Landed Cost in use from the 1950s to 
the early 2000s. Evidence also indicates that this continues to be the case for the Basic Fuel Price 
(BFP) which was implemented in 2003. The implication of this is that the regulated price of fuel 
has resulted in transfers, or subsidies, from consumers to producers. The OP26, formerly the tax 
regime applicable to the liquid fuels industry, also benefited liquid fuels producers more broadly 
as a result of government revenue foregone. Many of these favourable provisions were 
subsequently retained and expanded in the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act which replaced 
the OP26 in 2006. Looking at financial support to the synthetic fuels producers specifically, the 
section uncovered the various systems of tariff protection extended to the South African Torbanite 
Mining and Refining Company, Sasol and later Mossgas. Also important in this regard were the 
various low-interest loans extended to Sasol as well as the state’s cancellation of debt to Soekor 
and Mossgas.  
In addition to financial support, this section found instances of regulatory support to the liquid 
fuels producers. As a regulated price, the price of petroleum paid to producers by consumers falls 
into this category as well. Also important were the Main Supply Agreements (MSA) which 
stipulated that the other oil companies (OOCs) uplift 100 percent of Sasol’s production at an import 
parity price. This regulation had the effect of ‘skewing the market’ in favour of the synthetic fuels 
producer (International Energy Agency, 2006: 1). Furthermore, Mossgas and PetroSA later 
benefited from similar regulatory arrangements. Therefore, while the liquid fuels producers 
benefited from a number of financial and regulatory support measures from the South African 
state, the evidence indicated a particular preference given to the domestic synthetic fuels 
producers. Accordingly, one question that came out of the research is why Sasol’s interests in 
particular appear to trump the interests of the other oil companies active in the industry. An answer 
to this question was not adequately identified, making this an important question for future 
research.  
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Applying the historical institutional approach to the empirical evidence, Chapters Four and Five 
also found the way in which this system of support became entrenched over time. This process 
was evident in a number of ways. Firstly, as institutions such as the MSA were extended to new 
production plants and new actors, the institution became more entrenched and advanced the 
industry further along the path of state support. Secondly, the political economy environment of 
the industry made the institutions of support resistant to change. This was evidenced by the 
maintenance of industry regulation as well as the transition from the OP26 to the Tenth Schedule 
of the Income Tax Act. Indeed, these sections uncovered the ways in which the actors’ interests 
consolidated around the institutions of support that they sought to maintain. The above events 
provided evidence of the ways in which learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive 
expectations produced institutional path dependency, advancing the state further along the path of 
support to the liquid fuels industry in gender, and the synthetic fuels industry in particular. 
Furthermore, drawing on the dominant narratives around survival and security during the apartheid 
regime, and, later, energy security and support to BEE entrants, the study demonstrated the way in 
which path dependency entails a discursive aspect, which contributed to the resilience of many of 
these institutions. 
 What is more, these institutions remained resistant to change following the critical juncture 
represented by the country’s regime change. That is, even though many of these institutions 
underwent minor alterations, the fundamental aspects of the institutions were retained. This is in 
line with historical institutional thinking on the ways in which vested interests and path dependent 
processes are mechanisms of institutional inertia.  
Therefore, the research findings indicate that there are deeper institutional dynamics maintaining 
the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry in South Africa. These 
institutional dynamics are traced to the early development of South Africa’s liquid fuels industry 
and have remained resistant to change, even after the critical juncture represented by the end of 
apartheid and subsequent transition to democracy. Using the historical institutional approach, these 
chapters shed light on the institutional factors underpinning the liquid fuels subsidy regime. In 
doing so, the chapters reveal the institutional barriers undermining the prospect for subsidy reform. 
Additionally, the method for reaching these findings is also significant. This is due to the fact that 
the literature reveals that the historical institutional approach has not often been used to study 
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subsidies in developing countries. Furthermore, where the approach has been used to study fossil 
fuel subsidies, these studies have aimed to understand consumption subsidies, not production 
subsidies. Therefore the study advances the theoretical approach through applying it to a ‘new’ 
challenge in a developing country.  
The final section of the analysis, Chapter Six, provided evidence of the maintenance of the liquid 
fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid fuels industry in the present. Namely, the 
chapter found that the liquid fuels producers continue to receive production subsidies from the 
state. The section identified three main categories of support to liquid fuels producers: direct 
subsidies, government revenue foregone and market price support. In terms of direct transfers, the 
section identified R5, 563.23 million in transfers between 2009 and 2015, as indicated in Table 11 
below. This resulted in average annual transfers of R794.75 million during this period.  As state-
owned companies, PetroSA and CEF, have historically established relationships with the state and 
have benefited from state subsidies in the past.  
The benefit of these subsidies is that they tend to be more ‘visible’ and therefore are ‘easy’ early 
targets for subsidy reform. It should be noted, however, that the figures presented in this study may 
not represent a complete list of direct subsidies to liquid fuels producers. This is due to the overall 
lack of transparency surrounding government budgets and fossil fuel subsidies. In particular, these 
subsidies are listed in a variety of different government and company documents and can therefore 
be difficult to identify. Accordingly, an additional contribution of this study is that it compiles a 
single list of subsidies to be reviewed.  
Table 11: Direct Transfers to the Liquid Fuels Industry 
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While the section was not able to provide estimates of subsidies resulting from government 
revenue foregone, the tax provisions resulting in subsidies to liquid fuels production were noted. 
However, the GSI has found that producer subsidies are most often in the form of government 
revenue foregone (GSI, 2010a: 2). Therefore, further research is required so as to estimate the 
value of subsidies to liquid fuel production in South Africa as a result of these tax expenditures. 
Producing estimates of the value of these subsidies would shed light on the magnitude of these 
subsidies and highlight the important areas for fossil fuel subsidy reform. It should be noted, 
however, that the importance of listing the tax provisions resulting in subsidies should not be 
underestimated. As the study has revealed, there is considerable lack of clarity around what exactly 
constitutes a subsidy. Consequently, listing tax provisions and describing the way in which they 
result in government revenue foregone is significant as it enhances clarity around the question of 
subsidies and the ways in which they are conferred.  
Finally, in terms of market price transfers to Sasol, the section found that Sasol benefited from 
approximately R1.5 billion in transfers in 2012. This estimate was calculated in terms of the 
OECD’s method of calculating market price transfers. However, it should be noted that the 
accuracy of this figure is influenced by the petrol-diesel split of production from Sasol’s Secunda 
plant. The assumption for this estimate was taken from a 1999 study and was assumed to not have 
undergone any significant changes since this time (Lloyd, Rukato & Swanepoel, 1999: 6). The 
significance of this estimate, however, is it is the first attempt to use the OECD’s method to 
estimate market price transfers in South Africa. Additionally, the size of the estimate points to the 
magnitude of the issue and the extent to which consumers are subsidising Sasol.  
When identifying and estimating the value of these subsidies, it is important to keep in mind that 
research from the GSI reveals that few governments are aware of the full extent of fossil fuel 
subsidies they have granted (Whitley, 2013: 7). This is largely due to the fact that many forms of 
fossil fuel support have never been quantified. The issue is further exacerbated by the lack of 
budget transparency in many developing countries (Jones & Steenblik, 2010; de Mooij et al, 2012). 
The research findings on subsidies in the present are therefore significant in that they enhance 
empirical insight into South Africa’s liquid fuels subsidy regime and provide a list of subsidies to 
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be reviewed for reform. This is particularly important given South Africa’s pledge to phase out 
fossil fuel subsidies.  
These findings should also be considered in the context of the state’s efforts to expand renewable 
energy generation in the country. As previously discussed, liquid fuels production benefited from 
R5, 563.23 million in direct transfers between 2009 and 2015, an unquantified amount of tax 
subsidies, and R1.5 billion in market price transfers. While liquid fuels do not often compete 
directly with renewable energy, it is important to consider them in the context of low carbon 
transitions in general. Reducing excessive profits generated by companies such as Sasol would 
discourage misinvestment in coal to liquid and gas to liquid technologies. Such an action may also 
impact on allocative efficiency and improve welfare.  
Furthermore, these liquid fuels subsidies are in addition to the subsidies extended to fossil fuel 
production in the coal and electricity sectors, as can be found in Burton, Lott and Rennkamp (in 
press). In contrast, only one subsidy to renewable energy generation was identified and is 
associated with the Department of Trade and Industry policy incentives. National Treasury 
provides contingent liabilities to Eskom in order to guarantee the power purchase agreements 
between Eskom and renewable energy independent power producers. These contingent liabilities 
amount to R200 billion and are considered subsidies as they are ‘potential direct spending’ 
(National Treasury, 2016b: 94; WTO, 1994: 229). That is, although they are not an immediate cost 
to government, in the event that Eskom is not financially able to purchase power from these 
producers, government must purchase the power on the behalf of the company. Subsidies to liquid 
fuels and other fossil fuels exceed those which are extended to renewable energy and studies 
indicate that these differences distort cost comparisons between energy sources (Lazard, 2016). 
This may ultimately undermine the state’s efforts to promote a low carbon transition by making 
fossil fuels appear cheaper than they would otherwise be. At the very least, other lower carbon 
energy supply options, such as in transport or industry, may appear higher cost.  Future research 
is therefore necessary in order to identify any further subsidies to renewable energy and estimate 
the impact that subsidies have on the prices of fossil fuels and renewable energy in order to ensure 
more informed energy planning. 
The study was also novel in that it aimed to link the matter of historical and present financial and 
regulatory support to the liquid fuels industry in South Africa to the international fossil fuel 
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subsidies debate. Applying the ASCM and OECD PSE definitions of subsidies to the historical 
empirical evidence, the study identified the ways in which the diverse collection of regulations and 
financial assistance resulted in subsidies to the liquid fuels producers. As has been demonstrated 
throughout the study, there have been numerous instances of subsidisation, even if they have not 
often been identified or discussed as such. In highlighting the multitude of ways in which the state 
has provided, and continues to provide, subsidies to the liquid fuels industry, the study may open 
a dialogue around the more implicit, less understood aspects of support to fossil fuels.  
Through the above, the present study has addressed the persistence of liquid fuel production 
subsidies in South Africa, a topic which has received little attention or analysis in South Africa. 
However, one element of this persistence which should be addressed in future research is the muted 
policy debate about the reform of South Africa’s fossil fuel production subsidies. 
The study has addressed the issue of the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support to the liquid 
fuels industry in South Africa. Chapter Four analysed the historical development of the liquid fuels 
industry and established the ways in which financial and regulatory support measures were 
extended to the liquid fuels and synthetic fuels producers. Chapters Four and Five used the 
historical institutional approach to highlight the factors and processes that have sustained these 
institutions over time. Finally, Chapter Six revealed the ways in which liquid fuels production is 
subsidised in the present by identifying the main categories of direct transfers, government revenue 
foregone as well as market price transfers. In doing so, the study advanced the theoretical approach 
through applying it to a specific challenge and context that it has not previously been applied to. 
Additionally, the study provided a list of subsidies to be reviewed for reform, as well as the 
institutional barriers that may challenge any attempts at subsidy reform. These subsidies, and other 
subsidies to fossil fuel production, should be considered in the context of the state’s efforts to 
expand renewable energy generation in South Africa and further research is necessary in order to 
determine how liquid fuel production subsidies may undermine these efforts. These chapters 
therefore reveal the factors informing the maintenance of the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state 
support to the liquid fuels industry following South Africa’s transition to democracy. 
VIII. Conclusion 
The research question investigates why the liquid fuels subsidies regime and state support to the 
liquid fuels industry have not changed despite South Africa’s transition to democracy. In order to 
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address this research question, the study began by tracing the development of the liquid fuels 
industry in South Africa with a view to understanding the ways in which the state provided 
financial and regulatory support to the liquid fuels producers. The study found that in each stage 
of the industry’s development the state extended various measures of financial and regulatory 
support to the liquid fuels producers, with a specific focus on the synthetic fuels producers. Where 
relevant, the study shed light on the ways in which these measures of support have amounted to 
subsidies to their beneficiaries. In order to understand and explain how these institutions became 
entrenched or evolved over time, the study applied the historical institutional approach to the 
empirical evidence. In doing so, the study revealed that although many institutions underwent 
minor alterations over time, the broader institutions often remained in place. Furthermore, new, 
complementary institutions were often added to the institutional arrangement, which had the effect 
of reinforcing the collective. This was even the case following the critical juncture represented by 
the country’s transition to a democratic regime. The analysis revealed that path dependent 
processes,  vested interests, perceptions of sunk costs and institutional lock in were important 
drivers impacting on the maintenance of these institutions.  
It is also important to highlight that, in some cases, the continuity, alterations, or outright removal 
of institutions aligned with the interests of the main industry actors and were not necessarily 
induced by government policy. This is in line with the historical institutional view of institutions 
as, ‘…objects of ongoing skirmishes as actors try to achieve advantage by interpreting or 
redirecting institutions in pursuit of their goals, or by subverting or circumventing rules that clash 
with their interests’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 19). As the historical institutional approach has 
often been applied to explain phenomena in advanced economies, its application to a developing 
economy serves to advance the theory. This highlights an important contribution of the present 
study.  
By investigating liquid fuels production subsidies in the present, the study also enhanced empirical 
insight into South Africa’s liquid fuels subsidy regime. The study revealed a number of subsidies 
to the production of liquid fuels as a result of direct transfers, government revenue foregone as 
well as market price transfers. While the direct transfers are relatively ‘visible’, they are often 
listed in a number of different government documents and can be difficult to identify. Therefore, 
by compiling them into a single list, the present study has enhanced the transparency around the 
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subsidies and provided an easy-to-access and identify list of direct subsidies to be reviewed for 
reform. The study also identified the tax provisions resulting in government revenue foregone. 
While the study was not able to quantify the subsidies resulting from these tax provisions, Chapter 
VII noted these tax expenditures as areas for future research so as to identify the magnitude of 
these subsidies. In doing so, the study identified the more implicit ways in which liquid fuels 
production is subsidised in South Africa. Finally, the study estimated 2012 market price transfers 
to Sasol to be approximately R1.5 billion. The identification and estimation of this subsidy is 
important not only due to its magnitude but also due to the endurance of this institution. As stated 
in the previous chapter, however, the subsidies identified in this study may not represent a 
complete list of subsidies to liquid fuels production in South Africa, in part due to the lack of 
transparency around fossil fuels.  
Ultimately, the study highlights the many ways in which liquid fuels production is subsidised in 
the present, as well as the institutional drivers underpinning this subsidy regime. In this regard, it 
sheds light on the institutional barriers undermining the prospect for subsidy reform. In doing so, 
the study provides insight into the maintenance of the liquid fuels subsidy regime and state support 






Estimation of Market Prices Transfers to Sasol (2012) 
It is first necessary to estimate the volume of petrol production from Sasol for the year in question 
(2012). We are primarily interested in petrol volume as the BFP applies to petrol, not diesel. The 
value of petrol production will be inserted into the equation below (“production volume”).  
To estimate volume of petrol produced by Sasol in 2012: 
Assuming that 
Total Sasol production (2012) = 3,574,000 tons 
Then 2012 Sasol production (2012) = 3,242,278,261 kg 
And ratio of volume of petrol: diesel = approximately 70:30 in m3 (Lloyd, Rukato & Swanepoel, 
1999: 109) 
And density of petrol ρp = 737 kg/m
3 
        density of diesel ρd= 885 kg/m
3 
Then total production mass, Mt = Mpetrol + Mdiesel 
If Mpetrol or Mp = ρpVp and Mdiesel or Md = ρdVd 
Then Mt = ρpVp + ρdVd 
Substituting values into this equation gives, 
3,242,278,261 = 737Vp +885Vd 
Therefore, for a given volume, 70% or 0.7 is petrol and 30% or 0.3 is diesel, so for 1 unit of 
volume: 
Vp = 0.7V 
Vd = O.3V, where V = total volume 
Substituting these values gives: 
3,242,278,261 = 737 (0.7V) + 885 (0.3V) 
3,242,278,261 = 515.9V+265.5V   
3,242,278,261 = 781.4V – (where 781.4V is a weighted average to account for Sasol’s petrol: diesel production ratio)
Therefore, V = 4,149,319.505 m3 (total) 
Therefore, Vp = 4,149,319.505 m
3 (total) * 0.7 = 2,904,523.653 m3  
Converting M3 to litres:  
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Volume petrol: 2,904,523.653 m3 * 1000= 2,904,523,653 The table below indicates the average 
value of the cost, insurance and freight components of the BFP in 2012. This value is used as the 
OECD notes that for a net importer of a commodity the correct border price is the CIF price 
(OECD, 2016: 66). 
BFP data (2012): Average cost, insurance, freight charges 
Cost (c/l) 587.146 
Insurance (c/l) 0.913 
Freight (c/l) 21.002 
Avg CIF (c/l) 609.061 
(Mkhize & Maake, 2012) 
The table below indicates the BFP (c/l) price applied to petrol in 2012. The price for each month 
has been listed to indicate the figures included in determining the average price (minus government 














Avg BFP (c/l) 660.7117 
(CEF, 2012) 
The bolded values above are then inputted to the following equation: 
97 
Market price transfers = (domestic price 48– border price49) x production volume 
Therefore, 2012 market price transfers to Sasol =  
((660.7117 c/l – 609.061 c/l)/10050) * 2,904,523,653 =R 1,500,206,798 
48 Where the domestic price is the average BFP. 
49 Where the border price for a net importer of the commodity of interest is the Cost, Insurance, Freight (CIF) price 
(OECD, 2016: 66).  
50 The difference between the domestic and border prices are divided by 100 to covert from cents to rands. 
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